TOP SECRET

CABINET OFFICE

(This File must not go outside the Office.)

File Number

J/217/2

Previous Reference

For Cross References see inside of Cover

Date of Registration

18 MAR 1966

CAB163/97

CLOSED 1970
now J625

Joint Intelligence Committee

AFRICA

SOMALIA

New title SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
FO 5/2/70

Outlook for Br Somalia —

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
		closed 1969		E 406	

217/2

(8969) Wt. 25515/6107 2M 8/64 P.I. Gp. 610

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FIRST REVIEW FORM

FILE NUMBER: J217/2

FILE TITLE: AFRICA. SOMALIA

DATE OF FIRST REVIEW: Call-up for British Somaliland

1969

DESK OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATION GIVEN ON CABFORM 66:
(Tick box)

Destroy at First Review	Retain for further review at ..... years (Insert number)	Second Review	No CABFORM recommendation given
		✓	

REVIEWING OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATION:
(Tick box)

Destroy at First Review	Retain for further review at ..... years (Insert number)	Second Review
		✓

REVIEWING OFFICER'S COMMENTS ON HIS/HER RECOMMENDATION ABOVE:
(Where the reviewing officer's recommendation differs from the desk officer's, the reason(s) should be stated)

FOLIO 49

EXTRACT from JIC(69) 2nd MEETING held on Thursday 9th January 1969

J. 214/2.

SECRET

5. SOMALIA

said an opportunity had now arisen to check the accuracy of recent reports that Soviet SA2 missiles were being introduced into Somalia. He hoped to give the Committee further information in the near future.

The Committee -

Took note.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

S/F FOLIO 48

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

JIC(68)(N) 125

COPY NO. 99

12th December 1968

CAN/UK/US EYES ONLY

CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (A)

CABINET OFFICE
J
13 DEC 1968
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No. 214/2

JIC NOTE

The following JIC(A) Note was approved by the Joint Intelligence Committee (A) at their meeting on THURSDAY, 12th DECEMBER 1968.

SOMALIA - USSR

Deliveries of Soviet Military Equipment

1. More Russian military equipment was delivered to Somalia in late October/early November and further consignments are scheduled to arrive before February 1969. Equipment so far delivered includes MiG 17 aircraft, field guns, APCs, fire control radars and vehicles as well as considerable quantities of ammunition. Deliveries expected to arrive by February 1969 will possibly include MiG 21 and IL 28 aircraft, surface-to-air (SA 2) missiles, T-54 tanks and a large variety of military transport and engineer equipment. We do not yet know exactly in what quantities these equipments have been or are to be delivered, but evidence suggests that part (with the exception of the aircraft which are to be delivered direct from the USSR) will consist of material from the UAR, previously supplied to them by the USSR, and which is now being replaced by more up-to-date equipment.

2. Although we have no direct evidence of a new arms agreement having been signed between Somalia and the USSR, it would appear that this may well have taken place. Certainly one has been in the offing for some time, as is evidenced by the negotiations and high-level visits of recent months. Both the scale of the recent deliveries and the unlikelihood that the 1963 agreement included equipment of such advanced nature as that now reported to have been promised, point to the probability that a new agreement has been signed.

3. The ability of the Somali National Army (SNA), which includes the Air Force, effectively to absorb in any quantity the types of military equipment mentioned above is questionable, even in the longer term, and inevitably the SNA will become even more heavily dependent than it is now on Russian training and technical assistance. In particular the SNA would be unable, for a very long time, effectively to operate MiG 21s, if these arrive, or surface to air missiles and would be dependent on Russian or other expatriate assistance. Despite the extent of these deliveries, both completed and projected no significant increase in the overall military capability of the SNA, at least for the next year, is expected.

SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES (SA-2)

4. We reported in early October 1968 that we had grounds for believing the USSR might be introducing SAM into Somalia. We are still reasonably sure that this is the case, and the evidence suggests that the missiles are in the process of being installed near Hargeisa (about 150 miles South of Djibouti) and probably at Baidoa (about 100 miles Northwest of Mogadishu). Most of the military camps in the Northern region are in the general vicinity of Hargeisa, where there is also a military airfield, but the reasons for selecting Baidoa as a missile site are not clear. We are still unable to offer a satisfactory explanation why Russia should wish to introduce SAM into Somalia, and the CIA, whom we have consulted, remain unconvinced that it is happening. Further steps are being taken both by the Americans and by ourselves to confirm or deny the validity of the reports on which this assessment is based. Our previous speculations on why the Russians might be doing this included the following:-

(a) The Somalis may have requested SAM in 1967 as a counter to the Ethiopian contract for Canberra aircraft.

(b) The Russians may be attempting to ensure their continued military presence in Somalia for years ahead, by supplying sophisticated equipment which will necessitate the presence of their military advisers and specialists for a long time to come.

(c) The Russians may simply be preparing to extend their influence in the Horn of Africa and the general area of the Indian Ocean.

(Signed) M.W. PHILLIPS
for Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committees

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
12th December 1968

SECRET

SIS

FOLIO 44

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

JIC(67)(SEC) 224

COPY NO. 30

31st July 1967

UK EYES ONLY

J 214/2
J 194/1

CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

THE SOMALI THREAT TO KENYA UP TO THE END OF 1970
(Reference: JIC(67) 30 (Final)) (34)

When JIC(67) 30 (Final) was issued, the British High Commission in Nairobi passed a copy, without JIC markings, to General Penfold. Although no official Kenyan reaction has been reported, Mr. J. de C. Ling of the High Commission has sent the Commonwealth Office the following account of Kenyan Ministers' views -

"I heard on 5th July from a completely reliable source that the paper was considered on that date by a meeting of the very secret Kenyan Defence Committee of Ministers. The paper was read by the senior Ministers present, who, except for Bruce McKenzie, passed no comment.

McKenzie however made two points -

(a) that the paper took insufficiently into consideration Chinese influence in Somalia; and

(b) that the likelihood of a Somali attack on Kenya would depend more on Somali emotionalism than on the military feasibility of such an attack.

McKenzie said that the detachment of Islamic crusades from rational military assessments was illustrated by the recent conflict between the Arabs and Israel.

Although these comments were in a low key it seems probable that McKenzie will remain among those Kenyan Ministers who take the Somali threat more seriously than we do. Since I have learned the above in the strictest confidence, we cannot of course argue back to McKenzie at this stage, but feel well prepared to counter his two criticisms of the paper if and when he comes out in the open with them. Meanwhile, you may like to feed these two comments back to the JIC.

SECRET

At the same meeting, McKenzie referred to the Prime Minister's letter to President Kenyatta of 25th January, and said that crises like the present one in the Middle East and the Congo, and Britain's withdrawal from Aden, might delay Her Majesty's Government's going to Kenya's assistance in the event of a Somali attack because of overflying difficulties. McKenzie went on to tell his Ministerial colleagues that he thought a future British military presence in the area might be in the form of aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean. They agreed apparently that from the Kenya point of view, this would be all to the good."

(Signed) J.P. FOSTER
for Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

31st July 1967

DISTRIBUTION

JIC(Limited)
Mr. A.M. Palliser
Mr. J.A. Peduzie, MOD
Colonel P.H. Moir (DIS(DI4))

SECRET

Subject File

FOLIO 46.

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

JIC(67)(SEC) 192

COPY NO. 27

21st June 1967

CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

217/2.
197/1.

THE SOMALI THREAT TO KENYA UP TO THE END OF 1970
(Previous reference: JIC(67)24th Meeting, Minute 1)

At Annex is a copy of a letter from Mr. Walsh Atkins reporting the reaction of the High Commissioner in Nairobi to JIC(67)30 which he wishes me to circulate to members of the Committee and to the Joint Intelligence Staff for information and record.

(Signed) F.B. RICHARDS
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
21st June 1967

DISTRIBUTION
JIC Limited
Chairman, JIS
JIS 'B' Team

SECRET

SECRET

Annex to JIC(67)(SEC) 192

COPY OF A LETTER (PA 2/222/2 DATED 16TH JUNE 1967) FROM
MR. L.B. WALSH ATKINS, COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO SECRETARY, JIC

- -

THE SOMALI THREAT TO KENYA UP TO THE END OF 1970

I promised to record the gist of the letter which I have received from our High Commissioner in Nairobi (Iten 1 of JIC(67) 24th Meeting).

2. The High Commissioner is very grateful for all the work which the JIC put into JIC(67)30, which he found very well produced and convincing. He has given a copy of the paper (without a JIC superscription) to General Penfold who was also very grateful for it and clearly noted that the Kenyan fear of Somali attack was shown to be largely illusory! Peck has also shown the paper to his United States and Canadian colleagues.

3. The High Commissioner did not object to paragraph 13 of the paper which, as you will remember (Iten 5 of JIC(67)20th Meeting) was an attempt to remind the Kenyans, but in inoffensive form, of the importance of their own policies towards their citizens in the north-eastern province who, as he says, must be given some incentive to be Kenyan rather than Somali.

4. JIC(67)30 having been passed to General Penfold, it follows that any amendment to it or further comments should also be passed through the same channels.

5. In the more general context we have been in contact with the High Commissioner in Nairobi following the JIC discussion on 11th May (JIC(67)20th Meeting, Iten 5). It is agreed with him that the channel to be used in communicating intelligence to the Kenyans should depend upon the nature of the information being passed. If, for example, there is another JIC assessment, the High Commissioner will no doubt again choose General Penfold as the channel to the National Defence Policy Committee. But intelligence reports from our friends and from other sources should, he considers, be passed through the SLO to the Director of Intelligence for the National Security Executive.

6. The High Commissioner will also do his best to encourage the Kenyans to make available to us their own intelligence material, although he thinks that they have very little which is reliable.

SECRET

SECRET

45

Commonwealth Office
S.W.1

PA 2/222/2

16 June, 1967.

(A) 217/2.
R. 19.6.67.

Dear Brooks, Tic Reg.

8

THE SOMALI THREAT TO KENYA
UP TO THE END OF 1970

I promised to record the gist of the letter which I have received from our High Commissioner in Nairobi (Item 1 of JIC(67)24th Meeting). — 43

2. The High Commissioner is very grateful for all the work which the JIC put into JIC(67)30, which he found very well produced and convincing. He has given a copy of the paper (without a JIC superscription) to General Penfold who was also very grateful for it and clearly noted that the Kenyan fear of Somali attack was shown to be largely illusory! Peck has also shown the paper to his United States and Canadian colleagues. — 37

3. The High Commissioner did not object to paragraph 13 of the paper which, as you will remember, (Item 5 of JIC(67)20th Meeting) was an attempt to remind the Kenyans, but in inoffensive form, of the importance of their own policies towards their citizens in the north-eastern province who, as he says, must be given some incentive to be Kenyan rather than Somali. — 32.

4. /.....

F. B. RICHARDS, ESQ., C.M.G.,
CABINET OFFICE.

SECRET

4. JIC(67)30 having been passed to General Penfold, it follows that any amendment to it or further comments should also be passed through the same channels.

5. In the more general context we have been in contact with the High Commissioner in Nairobi following the JIC discussion on 11th May (JIC(67)20th Meeting, Item 5). It is agreed with him that the channel to be used in communicating intelligence to the Kenyans should depend upon the nature of the information being passed. If, for example, there is another JIC assessment, the High Commissioner will no doubt again choose General Penfold as the channel to the National Defence Policy Committee. But intelligence reports from our friends and from other sources should, he considers, be passed through the S.L.O. to the Director of Intelligence for the National Security Executive.

6. The High Commissioner will also do his best to encourage the Kenyans to make available to us their own intelligence material, although he thinks that they have very little which is reliable.

Yours ever,
Brian Walsh Atkins

(L. B. Walsh Atkins)

31F

44

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

42

3rd Reference: JIC(67)30(Final)

COPY NO._____

12th June, 1967

CABINET

217/2.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

THE SOMALI THREAT TO KENYA UP TO THE END OF 1970

Departments may wish to note that the above report has been passed to the following:-

Prime Minister
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs
Secretary of State for Defence

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

12th June 1967

[illegible] J.I.C. (67) 24th MEETING held on 8.6.67.

SECRET

43.

SECRET

1. THE SOMALI THREAT TO KENYA UP TO THE END OF 1970

(Previous reference: JIC(67) 20th Meeting, Minute 5)

3.2.

217/2

197/1.

MR. WALSH ATKINS said that JIC(67)30, a report on the above subject prepared by the Joint Intelligence Staff at the request of the Commonwealth Office in a form suitable for Kenyan eyes, had been very well received in Nairobi. He would be asking the Secretariat to circulate a letter from the UK High Commissioner reporting this.

The Committee -

Took note.

42.

7/6

(1) Sec. (See Folio 41).

(2) Admin - action as at X
(NB restrictive marking on Annex.)

217/2.

Done Daten.

37.

X

41.

CONFIDENTIAL

S/C

J 217/2

CABINET OFFICE, S.W.1.

2nd June 1967.

41

UK/US EYES ONLY

37

You will by now have seen JIC(67)30(Final) - "The Somali Threat to Kenya up to the End of 1970". We were grateful for the ONE comments on the draft of this paper and they have been taken into account. You will also see that there is a UK/US Eyes Only Annex on the Ethiopian Armed Forces, which is not being passed to the Canadians: the reason for this classification is one of source rather than political objections.

We should be grateful if you would do three things -

(a) let us know as soon as possible about the Embassy's clearance for this to be passed to the Americans, as usual;

(b) make the point, in passing the paper to the Americans, that the paper has been prepared at Kenya's request and with the intention that its substance should be made available to a few selected individuals in high positions thereby providing them with an assessment of the Somali threat over the next few years, which would be more soundly based than any the Kenyan authorities could produce for themselves. The report represents the best available JIC view and has not been slanted for Kenyan consumption although it has been written in such a way as to protect our sources;

(c) inform the Americans, in passing the paper to them, that we are asking our High Commissioner in Nairobi to show it to his American colleagues but the Kenyans will, of course, not be aware of this.

(F.B. RICHARDS)

P.A.G. Westlake, Esq., M.C.,
British Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

Copy to: Mr. M.H.G. Rogers Commonwealth Office
Mr. M.A. McConville, British High Commission, Ottawa.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

S/F

40

J 217/2

2nd June 1967.

37

You will shortly be receiving for your own use copies of JIC(67)30(Final) - "The Somali Threat to Kenya Up to the End of 1970". We were grateful for your advice in the preparation of this paper and CIA comments on it have been taken into account.

I have written to Peter Westlake asking him to make the point, in passing the paper to the CIA, that the paper was prepared at Kenya's request and with the intention that its substance should be made available to a few selected individuals in high positions thereby providing them with an assessment of the Somali threat over the next few years, which would be more soundly based than any the Kenyan authorities could produce for themselves. He is also pointing out that, while the report represents the best available JIC view, it has not been slanted for Kenyan consumption although it has been written in such a way as to protect our sources. We are asking our High Commissioner in Nairobi to show it to his United States colleague.

(F.B. RICHARDS)

Mr. J. Whitman,
United States Embassy,
LONDON, W.1.

Copy to: Mr. M.H.G. Rogers, Commonwealth Office.

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SECRET - UK EYES ONLY

E.R.

J 217/2

1728

MR. REID

37. (File when returned to Records)

I attach Sir Burke Trend's copy of JIC(67)30 (Final) - "The Somali Threat to Kenya up to the End of 1970".

2. This is the latest of our efforts to provide material for the Kenyans about the Somali Threat and a copy (minus JIC headings) has been sent to the High Commissioner in Nairobi to hand to General Penfold. General Penfold is preparing a paper for the Kenyan Government on the Somali threat. There is also a UK/US Eyes Only Annex on the Ethiopian armed forces, which will not of course be shown to the Kenyans but which could be seen by General Penfold on a personal basis at the discretion of the High Commission. The High Commissioner will show the body of the report to his American and Canadian colleagues but he will not, of course, let on to the Kenyans that the Americans and Canadians are in the picture.

3. The JIC have been careful not to slant the report for Kenyan eyes. Its conclusions are that the Somalis are unlikely to abandon their territorial claims for a "Greater Somalia", but that since by 1970 they will still be able to make only limited forays, probably without tanks or aircraft, into Kenya, they are more likely to pursue their claims by subversive means.

4. One statement in the report may need careful watching in view of the Soviet role in the Middle East crisis: while it is true that the Soviet presence and influence in the Somali Republic at present make for restraint, we cannot of course guarantee that this will continue to be the case indefinitely and this may affect the Somalis' attitude.

5. I recommend that I be authorised to pass this report to the Prime Minister and to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Defence Secretaries.

T B Richards.

(F.B. RICHARDS)

2nd June 1967

M-Richards

Action Gp Desk 12/6/67 - Y.K

12/6.

SECRET - UK EYES ONLY

SECRET

5/f

38.

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

First Ref. to JIC(67)30(Final)

COPY NO. 97

1st June 1967

UK/US EYES ONLY

CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

217/2.

197/1.

THE SOMALI THREAT TO KENYA UP TO THE END OF 1970

The attached restrictive marking Annex to the above report is circulated for information and record.

(Signed) J.P. FOSTER

for Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

1st June 1967

SECRET

THE ETHIOPIAN ARMED FORCES

Strength

The total strength of the Ethiopian armed forces is estimated at 38,000, of which 36,000 are ground forces. In addition there is a reserve army of 8,000. The army is currently organised on a four division basis. An expansion to 40,000 in the forces as a whole is expected by late 1967 when the army will consist of four divisions, each of 8,000 men, with a further 8,000 army troops. Each division will consist of three brigades, each of three battalions with supporting arms and services. The air force is not expected to expand significantly, but an additional DF/GA squadron of seven F5 aircraft (increasing to twelve in July) has been supplied by the United States. The navy is small and is mainly concerned with anti-smuggling operations. The detailed organisation of the armed forces is shown in Appendix A.

Morale

2. Apart from 3 Division, morale is good, particularly among the Imperial Bodyguard, whose pay and conditions of service are better than those of the rest of the army. In 3 Division, who have been on operations in the Ogaden for a considerable time, morale is only fair, and in some units poor. This can be attributed in the main to the inability of the army to maintain an efficient administrative organisation.

Capability

3. The four divisions are deployed territorially in an internal security role. The army is considered capable of maintaining internal order with the assistance of the police and, at present, of meeting any threat from Ethiopia's neighbours. The potential of the army is hampered by its poor logistic capability combined with lack of training at formation level, this in turn being due to the dispersion of the forces. The reserve army of 8,000 is of doubtful value; it has carried out no training above section level. The air force has the ability to provide limited support for ground forces. Of the 60 available operational aircraft some 60 per cent are serviceable and a fairly high operational standard is maintained under the supervision of American personnel. The small Navy is at present barely adequate for coastal patrols and has no offensive potential. It is completely under Western influence and a number of British, French and Norwegian contract officers hold the more important appointments. We find it difficult to assess capabilities in 1970 but doubt that they will differ significantly from the present.

Equipment

4. Equipment is mainly of American origin and a wide range of tanks, field artillery and transport is held. In general maintenance is poor, particularly of vehicles and communications equipment. There have been reports of shortages of these equipments within units which can be attributed to poor maintenance and inefficient administration. Main equipment holdings are shown at Appendix B.

THE ETHIOPIAN DEFENCE ORGANISATION AND ORDER OF BATTLE

THE EMPEROR

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chief of Staff & Comd Ground Forces

Deputy Chief of Staff

SECRET UK/US EYES ONLY

NAVY

(Personnel strength 1,000)

1 Seaplane tender (Ex. US)
5 Armed Coast guard
2 MTB (Not operational)
8 Landing craft

GROUND FORCES

(Strength 36,000)

AIR FORCE

(Personnel strength 1,250)

Ground Attack Sqn.	DF/GA Sqn.	Tpt. Sqn.	Training.
32 x Saab B-17 / Trojan T 28 A & D	12 x Sabre F 86 F, 7 x F5 (increasing to 12 in July)	16 x DC 3 / C 54 / DOVE / IL 14 / Alouette	20 x Saab T-33A

TA

8,000

1 Div (Imperial Bodyguard)

1 Bde	2 Bde	3 Bde
All Bns att 3 Div	11 Bn 20 Bn	12 Bn 15 Bn 16 Bn 23 Bn

2 Div

6 Bde	8 Bde	12 Bde
8 Bn 10 Bn	4 Bn 24 Bn 30 Bn	31 Bn 34 Bn 35 Bn

3 Div

9 Bde	10 Bde	11 Bde
1 Bn 6 Bn 17 Bn 22 Bn 25 Bn	9 Bn 19 Bn 25 Bn	3 Bn 5 Bn 7 Bn 13 Bn 18 Bn 26 Bn

4 Div

4 Bde	5 Bde	7 Bde
21 Bn 27 Bn 28 Bn	14 Bn 29 Bn 32 Bn	2 Bn 36 Bn

NOTES: 1. The Emperor is C-in-C of all three Services.

2. The Commander 1 Div (Imperial Bodyguard) has the right of direct access to both the Emperor and Minister of National Defence.

SECRET UK/US EYES ONLY

UK/US EYES ONLY

Appendix B to Annex to
JIC(67) 30 (Final)

TABLE OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Major Items	Nos. held
1. Navy	
Training Ships	1
Patrol Craft	7
Landing Craft	8
2. Air Force	
GA	32
DF/GA	12
Transport	16
Training & Light Ac	20
3. Army	
(a) Armour	77
(b) Artillery	
Field	138
Anti Tank	132
Air Defence	25
(c) Mortars	700
(d) Recoilless rifle	240
(e) Vehicles	2,000+
(f) Small arms	30,000

CONFIDENTIAL

S/F

FOLIO 34

J 217/2

18th May 1967.

This is to let you know that a JIC paper JIC(67)30(Final) "The Somali Threat to Kenya up to the End of 1970" has now been produced. This is essentially a revised version of JIC(66)36 "The Implications of Soviet Bloc Military Aid to the Somali Republic", which was passed to the Canadian authorities. This revised and updated version has been prepared at Kenya's request so that the substance of it can be made available to a few selected individuals in high positions and thus provide an assessment of the Somali threat over the next few years, which will be more soundly based than any the Kenyan authorities could produce for themselves. The report represents the best available JIC view. It has not been slanted for Kenyan consumption but it has been written in such a way as to protect our sources.

We shall be sending copies of JIC(67)30(Final) to the Canadian authorities in the usual way and should be grateful if you would pass on to them the background information in the preceding paragraph. We should be glad if the Canadian authorities would not reveal, especially to any Kenyan, that they know of the existence of the paper. We will ask our High Commissioner in Nairobi to show it to his Canadian colleague.

(F.B. RICHARDS)

Mr. C.F.W. Hooper,
Canada House,
London, S.W.1.

copies sent to
Mr Walsh Atkins,
Mr McConville

CONFIDENTIAL

p.w.o Submit

25a 7/5

Commonwealth Office
S.W.1

CONFIDENTIAL

17 May, 1967.

(A) 217/2.

Dear Brooks,

/ 34

Thank you for your letter J.217/2 of 16 May about the Somali paper. Paragraph 2 of Alan Crick's draft seems slightly more restrictive than I had expected. Unless there is some difficulty from your or his angle, I should have thought that it might run something like this:-

> "We shall be sending copies of JIC(67)30(Final) to the Canadian authorities in the usual way and should be grateful if you would pass on to them the background information in the preceding paragraph. We should be glad if the Canadian authorities would not reveal, especially to any Kenyan, that they know of the existence of the paper. We will ask our High Commissioner in Nairobi to show it to his Canadian colleague."

2. I would add a suitable paragraph to the letter which I shall be sending to our High Commissioner in Nairobi covering the paper.

3. Perhaps you would send a copy of the letter as sent to me and also to M.A. McConville in our High Commission in Ottawa.

Yours ever,
Brian Walsh Atkins

L. B. Walsh Atkins

Sec

A Sec 2.
Ch. of S.
Reg.
} a/a

18/5

F. Brooks Richards, Esq.,
Cabinet Office,
Whitehall,
London, S.W.1.

P.S.

Pl. new type letter with attached.
first para. as at (34) & 2nd para
as proposed above.

18/5

SECRET

S/F

35

CABINET OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1.
17th May 1967.

J 217/2

UK EYES ONLY

33

Thank you for your letter 1699/65/67G of 10th May 1967 about JIC(67)30 (Draft).

2. The DIS say that their information on Somali tanks comes from Italian sources not open to the Americans; they are confident the information is correct. They say, however, that in the incompetent hands of the Somalis the tanks do not constitute a significant additional threat.

(F.B. RICHARDS)

P.A.G. Westlake, Esq., M.C.,
British Embassy,
Washington.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

SF

34

J 217/2

16th May 1967.

I think Alan Crick mentioned to you in my absence that Bill Hooper of Canada House had asked whether it would be possible for the Canadian High Commissioner in Nairobi to see a copy of JIC(67)30(Final) "The Somali Threat to Kenya up to the end of 1970". He subsequently drafted the attached letter which he has suggested I might, after clearance with you, send to Hooper.

I should be glad to know whether you would agree to my writing in these terms.

(F.B. RICHARDS)

L. B. Walsh Atkins, Esq., C.M.G., C.V.O.,
Commonwealth Office,
London, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT LETTER TO MR. C.F.W. HOOPER, Canada House

This is to let you know that a JIC paper JIC(67) 30 Final "The Somali Threat to Kenya up to the End of 1970" has now been produced. This is essentially a revised version of JIC(66) 36 "The Implications of Soviet Bloc Military Aid to the Somali Republic", which was passed to the Canadian authorities. This revised and updated version has been prepared at Kenya's request so that the substance of it can be made available to a few selected individuals in high positions and thus provide an assessment of the Somali threat over the next few years, which will be more soundly based than any the Kenyan authorities could produce for themselves. The report represents the best available JIC view. It has not been slanted for Kenyan consumption but it has been written in such a way as to protect our sources.

[It occurs to us that although we are limiting circulation of this report to those for whom it is specifically designed, the Canadian High Commissioner in Nairobi might welcome sight of this document for background purposes and we propose to ask our High Commissioner to show it to his Canadian colleague. Similarly we are asking our High Commissioner in Ottawa to show it to the appropriate person there.]

A 16/5

(Photo destroyed)

D15 (D14)

✓ Any comment; please?

J. M. Foster
for Sec. JIC
16/5

Told B Team. Dft. 16/5

Sec. JIC.

Re answer at (ii) we have it information from Military Sources, not open to JIC (4) H. We do not doubt the correctness of the finding.

[illegible]
JIC (4).

6/5/67

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10 APR 1967

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BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

POLIO 33.

10th May, 1967.

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217/2.

Dear Brooks,

I sent to you yesterday by telegraph- 30a the substantive comments of ONE on the text and conclusions of JIC(67)30(Draft) on the Somali threat to Kenya. There is a further small point which might be worth pursuing. ONE say that whereas Appendix B shows 20 T54 tanks as held by the Somali Army, the Defense Intelligence Agency do not credit them with any T54 tanks at all.

Yours ever,

Peli Westlake

(P. A. G. WESTLAKE).

Copy passed to D.I.4 for comment.

F. B. Richards, Esq., CMG, DSC,
Cabinet Office,
London, S.W.1.

SECRET

EXTRACT FROM J. I. C. (67) 20th MEETING HELD ON 11.5.67

FOL 32

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CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

JIC(67) 20th MEETING HELD ON

THURSDAY, 11TH MAY 1967

217/2
197/1.

5. THE SOMALI THREAT TO KENYA UP TO THE END OF 1970. 24

(Previous reference: JIC(67)8th Meeting, Minute 9)

The Committee had before them JIC(67)30(Draft), a report on the above subject prepared by the JIS at the request of the Commonwealth Office in a form suitable for Kenyan eyes.

MR. WALSH ATKINS said that the Commonwealth Office had heard from our High Commissioner in Nairobi that the Kenya Government, including General Penfold, were most grateful for our offer to produce such a report. He had confirmed that there would be no difficulty about General Penfold being given for his own information only a 'UK Eyes Only supplement provided he was free to make such use as he thought fit of the report itself. The High Commission intended to inform the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the paper's contents only orally and in general terms. It would be necessary for the Committee to consider whether any further intelligence on the subject should be channelled through the Security Liaison Officer in Nairobi or through General Penfold.

THE CHAIRMAN, summing up this part of the discussion, said that the High Commissioner's proposals for handling the report were acceptable. The choice of channel through which future assessments or intelligence on this subject should be passed to the Kenyans would depend on the character of the material, though for any appreciation which updated the present report, General Penfold seemed the obvious choice. He felt that the Kenyans should again be pressed to make available to us any relevant intelligence they might acquire. In this context he noted that the High Commissioner had made arrangements whereby we might hope to be consulted before the Kenya authorities proceeded to act upon inaccurate, and possibly deliberately planted, intelligence.

EXTRACT FROM J. I. C. (67) 20th MEETING HELD ON 11.5.67

VOL. 32

SECRET

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The Committee -

(1) Took note with approval of the Chairman's summing up of this part of their discussion and invited the Commonwealth Office to act upon it.

The Committee then considered JIC(67)30 (Draft), together with amendments proposed by the JIS in the light of comments obtained by Mr. Westlake from the Office of National Estimates in Washington.

In the course of discussion, the following points were made -

(a) The redrafted paragraph 9 dealing with the situation likely to arise in Ethiopia on the death of the Emperor, as amended in discussion, was acceptable subject to further clearance with the Foreign Office.

(b) Paragraph 13 represented a compromise between strongly-held Foreign Office and Commonwealth Office views. The draft was the most which the Commonwealth Office felt could be said without creating an impression that we were giving advice to the Kenyans on their internal affairs. The Commonwealth Office would wish to direct the High Commissioner's attention to this somewhat delicate passage.

The Committee -

(2) Approved JIC(67)30(Draft), as amended in discussion, subject to clearance with the Foreign Office of the point at (a) above; and approved the UK Eyes Only Supplement.

(3) Agreed the distribution proposed, subject to the copies intended for the High Commissioner in Nairobi and General Penfold being sent to the Commonwealth Office for onward transmission under a covering letter and directed the Secretary to issue it accordingly.

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
11th May 1967.

EXTRACT FROM J. I. C. (67) 20th MEETING HELD ON 11.5.67 32

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Group/Class ..... CAB 163 .....

Piece ..... 97 .....

FIRST REFERENCE TO
JIC(67) 30 (DRAFT)
10TH MAY 1967.

RETAINED BY
DEPARTMENT
UNDER
SECTION 3(4)

(date) ..... 16/7/02 .....

(Signed) ..... A Farnell .....

J 217/2

CABINET OFFICE,
Whitehall,
London, S.W.1.

5th May, 1967

David Bendall told me in a recent letter that you were away from the office ill. I was sorry to hear this and hope that you are now back.

... 2. I am sending you herewith a copy of a draft report on "The Somali Threat to Kenya up to the end of 1970" which is due to be taken by the JIC next Thursday, May 11th. Copies of this have been given to the CIA here but John Whitman has warned me that he is unlikely to be able to elicit CIA comments by May 11th: he suggested that if we want these in a hurry, it would be better for you to take the paper round and show it to someone in CIA at desk level, who perhaps would be able to give you his off-the-cuff reactions. From previous exchanges with the CIA on this subject, we think it likely that they will rate the Somali threat to Kenya even lower than the JIS have done in this estimate. At the same time they have better information about Somalia and Ethiopia than we have and it would be helpful to be able to tell the Committee even in general terms that they do not dissent from our assessment. If they were able to follow this up with more detailed comments later, so much the better.

(F.B. RICHARDS)

P.A.G. Westlake, Esq., M.C.,
British Embassy,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

...

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JIC(67) 30 (Terms of Reference) COPY NO. 72

17th March 1967

CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

THE SOMALI THREAT TO KENYA UP TO THE END OF 1970

A report is required on the above subject (JIC(67) 8th Meeting, Minute 9, refers) for passing to the Kenyan authorities. It should cover the following aspects -

(a) Factors affecting future Somali Policy towards Kenya (Foreign Office)

"Greater Somalia" aspirations, Soviet influence in Somali Republic and Policy in the Horn of Africa, UAR Relations with Somali Republic, British departure from Aden, results of referendum in French Somaliland, possible death of Emperor of Ethiopia, possible conflict with Ethiopia, influence of OAU.

(b) The Somali Armed Forces (DIS)

(i) Strength (Order of battle details to be in an Appendix)
(ii) Loyalty and Morale
(iii) Equipment (All details to be in an Appendix)
(iv) Soviet Training

} present and projected

(c) Somali military capabilities (DIS)

(i) 1967
(ii) 1970

(d) Nature and scale of Somali support for Shifta operations within Kenya (DIS)

(e) Conclusions (to be drafted later)

2. Much of the material for the report is contained in the following existing JIC papers -

JIC(67)(N) 19 Somali military threat to Kenya.

JIC(66) 75 Horn of Africa - possible consequences of French policy towards French Somaliland

SECRET

JIC(66) 36 Implications of Soviet Bloc Military Aid to Somali Republic.

JIC 654/66 Sanitised version of above.

JRD Memorandum (LR 1/12) "The Greater Somalia Question" is also useful. The essentially fresh aspects of the new paper relate to the forecasts of developments under the various headings up to the end of 1970.

3. It is realised that security considerations may necessitate either the generalisation or elimination of a considerable amount of detail and it is requested that any important material unsuitable for Kenyan eyes should be provided for inclusion in a separate document, which would be given special treatment. This material should include an estimate of Ethiopian military strength and capabilities up to 1970, which the DIS are invited to provide.

4. The CIA will be invited to comment on the paper in draft.

5. Departments are invited to forward contributions as directed above, to reach the Chairman, JIS by 5.00 p.m. on FRIDAY, 7th APRIL 1967.

(Signed) J.P. FOSTER
for Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

17th March 1967.

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THIRD REFERENCE TO
JIC (66) 36 (FINAL)
15TH MARCH 1967

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(date) ..... 16/7/02 .....

(Signed) ..... A Farrelly .....

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Piece ..... 97 .....

FOLIO 27

LETTER & MEMO

U.S. EMBASSY TO JIC SEC

9TH MARCH 1967

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UNDER
SECTION 3(4)

(date) ..... 16/7/02 .....

(Signed) ..... A Donnelly .....

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FOREIGN OFFICE 26

3th March 1967

J 217/2
1971

...

I enclose a copy of JIC(67)(N)19 - "The Somali Military Threat to Kenya". The Foreign Office ask that you should pass it to Mr. R.J.R. Owen in the Chancery, with reference to the second paragraph of his letter 10/10 to Mr. Speares of 24th January. Thank you very much.

JPF

(J.P. ROSCOE)

F.A.G. Westlake, Esq., MC,
British Embassy,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

JIC(67) 10th Meeting held on

THURSDAY, 2ND MARCH 1967

8. THE SOMALI THREAT TO KENYA

(Previous reference: JIC(67) 8th Meeting, Minute 9)

MR. CRICK said that, as desired by the Committee, he had held a meeting to draft terms of reference for the report required for the Kenyans. Three questions had arisen; first over the political justification of the report: this had now been resolved between the political departments concerned; second the extent to which any useful addition could in fact be made to the material already prepared; third, whether any longer-term assessment of Somali military effectiveness could provide worthwhile guidance.

MR. WALSH ATKINS said that the necessity for providing the Kenyans with an assessment stemmed from the fact that they believed they had new information which to some degree invalidated the estimate of the threat we had given them in August 1966 (JIC 654/66 refers). The Prime Minister had assured President Kenyatta that we would maintain contact with the Kenyans in assessing the Somali threat. Mr. Walsh Atkins confirmed that there was no requirement to go beyond a strictly objective assessment. The requirement for this to cover a four year period was linked to Major-General Penfold's planning requirement. The Commonwealth Office appreciated the difficulty of looking so far ahead and would, if necessary, have to accept a shorter time scale.

The following points were made in discussion -

(a) The Somali Army was brand new and there was no yardstick by which to judge its likely performance in four years time.

(b)

(c) The DIS were in close touch with the US authorities on the subject and their assessment of the Somali threat was, if anything, pitched lower than ours. It was not likely that they would be able to contribute much of substance to the draft but nevertheless it would be useful to obtain confirmation that they concurred with the UK view.

(d) It would be for consideration how the paper should be passed to the Kenyans. It would probably help General Penfold to use him as the channel of communication.

Summing up, THE CHAIRMAN said that they would wish the Joint Intelligence Staff to proceed as far as possible as earlier directed but the Committee realized that the assessment of the present threat would differ little from that contained in JIC(67)(N)11; and that the longer-tern outlook would necessarily have to be expressed in general terms.

The Committee -

(1) Took note with approval of the Chairman's summing up.

(2) Instructed the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Staff to proceed accordingly.

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Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

2nd March, 1967

EXTRACT FROM J. I. C. (67) 10th MEETING HELD ON 2.3.67.

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

JIC(67) 8TH MEETING HELD ON

THURSDAY, 23RD FEBRUARY 1967

9. THE SOMALI THREAT TO KENYA

(Previous reference: JIC(67)3rd Meeting, Minute 2)

MR. WALSH ATKINS said that arrangements had been made last August for certain senior Kenyan Ministers and officials to see a sanitized version of JIC(66)36 (Final): The Implications of Soviet Bloc Military Aid to the Somali Republic (JIC 654/66). President Kenyatta had in October told us that he would be sending two of his Ministers to London to discuss the Somali threat to Kenya with Ministers here. There had in fact been two such visits and, as a brief for the second of these, a JIC Note (JIC(67)(N)11) had been prepared. Although a representative of the Commonwealth Office had concurred in this, its tone was thought too complacent to allow even a sanitized version to be given to the Kenyans who had made it clear that they had thought the paper of last August had under-estimated the threat.

The Security Service had now heard that the Kenya authorities had in January established a National Security Executive (NSE) composed of the President's closest security advisers under the Chairmanship of Arap Noi (the Vice President). (The Secretary of this committee is the seconded Security Service Research Officer mentioned in JIC 817/66 of 26th September 1966.)

A National Defence Policy Committee (NDPC) was also established in January. The Chairman of the NDPC is Arap Noi, four Ministers are members and the Secretary is Major General Penfold (Chief of the Defence Staff).

The existence of both committees is treated as Top Secret by the Kenyans and has not been revealed to Kenyan Ministers generally.

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General Penfold and the NDPC were anxious to have an assessment of the external threats to Kenya on which to base a forecast of military requirements. Although General Penfold saw selected intelligence material at the British High Commission on a personal basis, he could not use with the Kenyans the information so received. There was no organisation in Kenya capable of providing the required assessment. The Director of Intelligence was not charged with the collection of external intelligence and the embryo External Intelligence Service (EIS) is not adequate for this task. In these circumstances the Security Service representative referred to above understood that General Penfold proposed, with his help, to undertake preparation of the necessary threat papers himself. He hoped in so doing to be able further to restrain the impetuous impulses of Kenyan Ministers: the Prime Minister's advice to them to take the matter to the United Nations seemed already to have made some impression.

From a letter which General Penfold had written to a personal contact in the Ministry of Defence it appeared that he required from us, either as a basis for his own papers or in a form which could be communicated direct to the Kenyan authorities, estimates covering the following questions -

(a) Kenyan relations with Ethiopia are friendly in the face of the common threat from the Somali Republic. What is the situation in Ethiopia? What are that country's military capabilities? What is our estimate of the sequence of events when the Emperor dies?

(b) Is the major future threat to Kenya likely to come from an intensification of the Shifta campaign, or from an overt attack on the Northern Frontier District by the Somalis?

(c) The possibility of a Somali invasion poses a number of other questions. What are their political intentions? What are their military capabilities? What is the position of the Russian advisers? What would be the Somali reaction if Kenya adopted a more aggressive policy?

MR. WALSH ATKINS suggested therefore that the Chairman JIS be asked to hold a meeting to consider the necessary terms of reference for the necessary study or studies. Most of the required material existed in previous JIC reports though there was the difficulty that these only reviewed the period up to the end of 1968. General Penfold needed assessments covering the next four years. It would be a matter of some delicacy how to answer the question of what we thought would happen after the death of the Emperor of Ethiopia. He suggested the CIA should be asked to comment on the paper in draft: the Kenyans thought we were withholding relevant information from them, but his own enquiries suggested that we were in fact very poorly informed about Somalia.

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THE CHAIRMAN, summing up, said the Committee would wish to go as far as possible in providing the papers asked for. He felt that, perhaps because of the short-term nature of our past assessments, these had appeared to adopt rather too complacent a view. It was important that the Kenyans should feel we were taking their anxieties seriously. The matter was intrinsically important from our own point of view as there was a risk we might find ourselves with an awkward and unforeseen commitment. The Kenyans should, however, be pressed to provide us with all relevant intelligence which they themselves obtained.

The Committee -

(1) Took note with approval of the Chairman's summing-up.

(2) Instructed the Chairman, JIS, to hold a meeting at an early date to draft terms of reference for a report, suitable for Kenyan eyes, on the Somali threat to Kenya up to 1971/72. The report should as far as possible cover all the questions raised by General Penfold and the following specific points:-

(i) the strength, morale and capabilities of the Somali armed forces;

(ii) the present amount of Russian and UAR equipment in the Somali Republic, and its possible build-up;

(iii) the Russian military training team;

(iv) likely policy of the Somali Republic towards Kenya in the light of future developments such as our forthcoming departure from Aden or conflict following the referendum in French Somaliland.

It would be for consideration how far the paper could refer explicitly to the situation that would arise after the death of the Emperor of Ethiopia.

(3) Invited the Defence Intelligence Staff and the Commonwealth Office to consider how General Penfold might best be kept informed of the Committee's intentions and of progress.

(4) Instructed the Chairman, JIS, to arrange for the required study to be prepared, drawing upon the material already available in JIC 654/66 and JIC(67)(N)11. Any UK Eyes Only material should be relegated to an Annex. Some of this might be suitable for passing to General Penfold and selected Kenyan Ministers on a personal basis. The CIA should be invited to comment on the report in draft. Since General Penfold needed to complete his own reports within three months, the JIC assessment should be completed and submitted for consideration by the Committee and for despatch within two months.

EXTRACT FROM J. I. C. (67) 8th MEETING HELD ON 23.2.67.

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JIC(67)(N) 19

COPY NO. 28

21st February 1967

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CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

JIC NOTE

THE SOMALI MILITARY THREAT TO KENYA

The attached JIC Note has been prepared by the African Current Intelligence Group, in consultation with the Joint Intelligence Staff, and has been approved out of Committee.

(Signed) J.P. FOSTER

for Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

21st February 1967.

DISTRIBUTION

JIC(Limited)
JIS ('B' Team)
Mr. H.J.H. Maud, Foreign Office
Mr. P.A.G. Westlake, BE Washington
British Embassy, Washington
Non-British Authorities (including London representatives) -
CIA (Washington)
JIC (Ottawa)

SECRET

(97792)

Annex to JIC(67)(N) 19

THE SOMALI MILITARY THREAT TO KENYA

In this note we examine the organisation, disposition and equipment of the Somali Army and give an assessment of its capability. We then outline the organisation and disposition of the Kenya Army. Based on these points we make an assessment of the Somali military threat to Kenya. Replies to specific questions are at Appendix,

The Somali Army

2. General. As a result of the Russian military aid agreement, signed in 1963, the Somalis have embarked on the complete reorganisation, re-equipment and retraining of their army. However, the programme for this has continually fallen behind, and it is at present intended that it should be completed by the end of this year, though this stage is in fact unlikely to be reached before late 1968. There is a Russian Military Training Team, some 200 strong, in the country.

3. Organisation. The intention is that the Somali National Army (SNA) (9,000 strong, with a target of 10,000 by 1968) should be organised into eight mechanised battle groups, each containing tanks and artillery. However, progress with this scheme has been very slow, and to date only two of the battle groups have moved beyond an intermediate stage in their re-organisation and re-training. Progress with the formation and training of the necessary administrative units is even slower.

4. The Army Air Force. The Air Force is a branch of the Army. Pilots have received training in the Soviet Union, and also in the Somali Republic by Soviet Instructors, but progress has been slow. It is possible that Somali pilots may by now have the ability to operate jet aircraft in a limited ground attack role against opportunity targets. However, we do not believe that they yet have the capacity to undertake a pre-planned set-piece ground attack, nor are they yet capable of carrying out interceptions of other aircraft. In addition, the only airfield in the southern part of the country at present suitable for the operation of jet aircraft (at Mogadishu) is at extreme range from the Kenyan border.

5. The Naval Wing. This also comes under the Army Commander. It is only 150 strong, manning at the most six patrol boats, and is based in the north of the country at Berbera.

(97792)

6. Equipment. Virtually all equipment is of Soviet origin and includes T54 and T34 tanks, armoured personnel carriers, field and air defence guns, and MiG 15 and MiG 17 aircraft. Somalis appear to be very slow to learn technical skills. Serviceability is assessed as poor, there is a general lack of maintenance, and equipment has been misused.

7. Morale. A Soviet military mission in mid-1966 is reported to have noted an atmosphere of apathy among both officers and men, which manifests itself in resistance to prolonged training programmes together with continual cases of collective indiscipline. Recent reports point to considerable dissension amongst the more senior officers. Overall, morale is assessed at best to be only fair to good.

8. Dispositions. The Somalis appear to be mainly concerned over the threat from Ethiopia. Only about a third of the Army is deployed opposite the Kenyan frontier, while priority in the training and re-equipment programme is being given to units in the north and centre of the country opposite Ethiopia.

9. Capabilities. Due to the slow progress with training, the difficulties with technical equipment, and low morale, the Somali Army does not have a capability commensurate with its potential in terms of equipment. We believe that it will not be able to conduct prolonged offensive operations for the next two years and possibly not for the two years thereafter, up to the end of 1970. It will however be able, during the next two years, to deal with any internal security problem, defend its own borders, and perhaps make limited forays into neighbouring countries. However, in the context of limited forays we doubt its ability to move armour to the Kenyan border (even if the report is confirmed it has received eight tank transporters) and thereafter undertake offensive operations. The nearest armoured unit (at Mogadishu) is over 300 miles from the border; the terrain is rough with poor roads; tank crews are still in the early stages of their training and maintenance is poor.

The Kenyan Forces

10. The Kenyan Forces number some 5,000, organised as an infantry brigade group (three battalions) together with a small transport Air Force which is largely manned by RAF aircrew, and a Navy with three small patrol boats. The forces are commanded by a British officer and there is a substantial British training team. Morale is not high, and we suspect, though we have no firm evidence, that their efficiency and capability are declining. At least half the Army is permanently deployed in the Northern Frontier District, where it is engaged in operations against dissident Shifta,

(97792)

who are armed and encouraged by the Somali Republic. There is a defence agreement with Ethiopia, and the Ethiopians could be expected to come to Kenya's assistance in the event of Somali aggression. It is not at present clear whether such assistance would decisively affect the issue.

Conclusions

11. In general, we concur with the conclusions of the previous JIC report on this subject - "The implications of Soviet Bloc Military Aid to the Somali Republic", JIC(66) 36.

12. In particular, we conclude that -

(a) The Somalis will not be able to mount prolonged offensive operations against Kenya before the end of 1968, and possibly not for a further two years thereafter.

(b) The Somalis may already have the capability to mount limited operations across the Kenyan border, but with only small forces. Although such attacks could be materially and politically damaging the political assessment of their likelihood (paras. 7-8 of Appendix)is relevant.

(97792)

Appendix to Annex to JIC(67)(N) 19

REPLIES TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

I. Q. Has there been an intensification of Shifta activity in the last year?

A. Yes.

II. Q. Are the Shifta using sophisticated weapons, such as plastic mines and modern automatic weapons?

A. The Shifta have been armed with automatic weapons for some time, though we have no evidence that they are particularly adept in their use; they have been using mines (including plastic mines) and explosives for the past six months, and have inflicted considerable damage and casualties. The weapons and mines that have been used are not particularly modern, and are similar to those employed by dissidents elsewhere in Africa, including the Congo, Mozambique and Rhodesia.

III. Q. How far are the Somali armed forces involved in the Shifta's training and operations?

A. We do not know how much the SNA is involved in the training of Shifta, but what training is carried out is sponsored by the SNA and Somali Police. There are a number of Shifta training camps in Somali Territory, adjacent to the border with Kenya. We know of no direct Somali military participation in Shifta operations in Kenya; though the Kenyans claim to have information to the contrary. we can neither confirm nor refute it. However, there is little doubt that the Shifta get their weapons and ammunition through the Somali forces.

IV. Q. What is the present amount of Russian and UAR equipment in the Somali Republic? Is the build up going on? Do we accept the figures of tanks, tank transporters, fighters and destroyers given recently by the Kenyans? What radar facilities do they have?

A. (a) There is virtually no UAR equipment in the Somali Republic.

(b) Russian supplies have tailed off considerably during the past six months. This is probably due partly to Somali inability to absorb what they already hold, a point which must have been quite apparent to the visiting Russian military mission in mid-1966, and partly to the fact that we believe that deliveries are about 80 per cent complete.

(c) Tanks - holding are 20+ T 54 and 80+ T 34.
Tank Transporters - possibly 8 have arrived but their location is unknown.
Fighter aircraft - holdings are 8 MiG 15 and 8 MiG 17.
There are no known UAR pilots.
Destroyers - None are held, the Somalis could not man them if they were, and we think it most unlikely that the UAR would provide such craft in the foreseeable future, or that the Russians would permit it.

(d) The Somalis have an early warning radar at Mogadishu. When they have learnt to fly their fighter aircraft, and when they have learnt to operate the radar, then the latter can be used to control the aircraft on operations and to assist in the interception of hostile aircraft. In addition, there are, throughout the country, air defence artillery units which have a radar facility. There has been a recent report of a large Russian sponsored radar station on the extreme north-east tip of the country; this could in no way be directed at Kenya, and we believe it could be connected with Russian space activities.

V. Q. Do we think that developments in the Horn of Africa, such as our forthcoming departure from Aden, the possible death of the Emperor of Ethiopia, or a flare-up of the French Somaliland problem, might make the Somalis and their Soviet and UAR backers more disposed to escalate the war against Kenya? In particular, might the Somali Government try to seize the town of Mandera, just inside the Kenya border as a lever to help them in their elections due in May or June this year?

A. The claim of the Somali Republic for self determination for the Somali peoples of north-east Kenya, and the activities of the Somali Shifta within the Kenya border, which are supported and assisted by the Somali Republican Government, derive very largely from ethnic considerations. Somali/Kenyan relations are therefore chiefly conditioned by the Somali Government's pursuit of their "Greater Somalia" policy, but external factors may have some effect upon developments on the border.

2. Aden

It would be surprising if a British withdrawal from Aden did not have some ultimate effect on Kenya/Somali relations. The exact effect, however, is unpredictable at present, since much will depend on whether a Federal Government of moderate complexion can be successfully established in South Arabia or whether the territory falls under UAR domination. Irrespective of the outcome in South Arabia, the closure of the British base in Aden might lead the Somalis to believe that British ability to come to the aid of Kenya, in the event of an attack from Somalia, was substantially reduced thereby. In this sense, it could be argued that the Somalis might be disposed to take greater risks with the Kenyans. We believe, however, that the Somali Republican Government would continue to assume that British relations with the Kenya Government are manifestly so close that Britain would not hesitate to reinforce Kenya in the event of an all-out Somali attack. The British departure from Aden is therefore unlikely to be a major factor conditioning Somali attitudes towards Kenya.

3. UAR

African hostility has led the Somali Government to attempt to better their relations with the Arab world generally. However, we have no evidence that relations with the UAR have become particularly friendly or that Cairo propaganda now favours the "Greater Somalia" cause. Even if South Arabia falls under UAR domination after the British withdrawal, it does not necessarily follow that UAR support for increased Somali pressure upon Kenya would develop. We believe that the UAR's pre-occupations elsewhere and political judgment may disincline them from closer involvement with the Somali regime which is generally unpopular elsewhere in Africa.

4. The Soviet Union

The Soviet Union's present policy appears to be to avoid involvement in disputes between African States. They are therefore likely to use what influence their substantial military aid to the Somali Government gives them to counsel restraint. In particular we would not expect them to permit Russian personnel to take part in offensive operations against Kenya. While it is an important aim of the Soviet Union to obtain a position of substantial influence in the Middle East and Africa, support for the Somali Republic is perhaps a poor instrument for this purpose. The Somali Republic is neither wholly Arab nor wholly African and, for the very reason that it is on bad terms with its more influential neighbours, Ethiopia and Kenya, is an unsound base on which to build a

position of influence in Africa. There have been signs that the Soviet Union is becoming increasingly aware of this consideration, and thus of the risk to their position elsewhere of too close involvement with Somali adventures. We believe that deliveries under the military aid agreement between the Soviet Union and the Somali Republic are virtually complete and we have no evidence that any fresh agreement has been made.

5. The Death of the Emperor of Ethiopia

The effect of the death of the Emperor of Ethiopia is difficult to estimate. Within Ethiopia our present view is that the Crown Prince would probably succeed peacefully to the throne, and stability would be maintained thereafter. But we cannot be sure of this, and the situation within Ethiopia certainly contains the seeds of revolution. In the event of internal disturbances in Ethiopia, we think it possible that the Somali Republic might take advantage of the situation to improve its position as regards the Haud, but, although in the case of such disturbance the exact course of events is unpredictable, we see no prima facie reason why the situation should lead to an escalation of Somali activity against Kenya.

6. French Somaliland

The French seem confident that the referendum in French Somaliland on 19th March will go in favour of continued association with France. If so it is difficult to predict the Somali Government's reaction. It is possible that public attention would be focussed on the continuing "colonial" status of French Somaliland and that there might in consequence be a reduction in Somali support for Shifta activity in Kenya. On the other hand the Somali Government might be tempted to direct attention away from French Somaliland and towards the Ogaden and Kenya.

7. Likelihood of Increased Somali Pressure against Kenya

Our information about affairs within the Somali Republic is too scanty to allow a sound judgment of the probabilities, but it is possible that the Somali Government might feel it necessary to demonstrate some progress in the direction of "Greater Somalia", in order to influence the result of the Presidential elections which are due to be held in the summer. The town of Mandera, only one mile over the border with Kenya might be seen as a tempting target but this appears to us to be no more than speculation by the Kenyans. Nor have we any evidence which supports the Kenya fear that a more extreme government would be installed in the Somali Republic after the Presidential elections. Our

impression has been that Abdirazak, the present Prime Minister, is firmly in control and maintains his tacit alliance with President Osman which should lead to the latter's re-election. However, it is possible that Communist money might be successfully employed to bribe their National Assembly to elect a more extreme President who might then exercise his power under the Constitution in certain circumstances to dissolve the Assembly. The General Election which followed could then return a new Assembly prepared to tolerate a more extreme Government.

8. On balance we would think it more likely that the Somalis will continue to operate by supporting the Shifta bands as they have done up to now rather than by a direct military attack upon Kenya.

SECRET

SF 22

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

Second Reference to JIC(67)(N) 11

COPY NO. 56

21st February 1967

UK EYES ONLY

CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

217/2.
197/1.

THE SOMALI MILITARY THREAT TO KENYA

Departments have now agreed that the above-mentioned JIC Note need not be classified "UK EYES ONLY" on source grounds and have agreed to its being passed to the United States and Canadian authorities, subject to a number of amendments on political grounds. For ease of reference these are listed below -

(a) Paragraph 1, lines 5 and 6
Delete "posed by the CO, following their discussion with Kenyan Ministers".

(b) Alter the title of the Appendix to "replies to specific questions".

(c) Alter the answer to the first question in the Appendix to "yes".

(d) In Question IV, line 4, delete "Kenyan Minister of Agriculture" and insert "Kenyans".

(e) In Question V, lines 7-8, delete "Kenyan Ministers as the Americans are said to have warned" and insert "Kenyans"

(f) Near the bottom of page 7, delete "and we know of no basis for the alleged American belief that the town might be seized by Somali forces".

2. A sanitised version (JIC(67)(N) 19) has therefore been prepared and is being passed to the Americans and Canadians. A limited number of copies are also being made available to JIC Departments.

(Signed) J.P. FOSTER
for Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

20th February 1967.

DISTRIBUTION

JIC
JIS ('B' Team)
COS Secretariat

SECRET

Confidential

Registry Pse submit with file & spare copy of JIC(67)(N)11. 21/2

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE

DOWNING STREET
LONDON S.W.1

21.

21/2. (A)

Whitehall 2323
Your reference:
Please quote in reply: PX 10/11

16 February, 1967

Dear Paul,

Would you please refer to the note which you circulated on 14 February concerning JIC(67)(N)11 - the Somali military threat to Kenya? 19.

The Commonwealth Office agree to this note being passed to the Americans and Canadians subject to the following alterations:-

(a) paragraph 1, lines 5 and 6. Delete "posed by the C.O., following their discussion with Kenyan Ministers".

(b) alter the title of the appendix to "replies to specific questions".

(c) alter the ~~officer~~ answer to the first question in the appendix to "yes".

(d) in question IV, line 4, delete "Kenyan Minister of Agriculture" and insert "Kenyans".

(e) in question V, lines 7 - 8, delete "as the Americans are said to have warned".

(f) near the bottom of page 7 delete "and we know of no basis for the alleged American belief that the town might be seized by Somali forces".

Yours ever,
Martin

(M.H.G. Rogers)
Political Affairs Department

Agree D. Draft JTF 2/2

Registry.

J. P. Foster, Esq.,
Cabinet Office,
London, S.W.1.

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20

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

First Reference to JIC(67)(N) 11

COPY NO. 57

14th February 1967

CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

21/2

197/1.

THE SOMALI MILITARY THREAT TO KENYA

The Foreign Office have asked that the above-mentioned JIC Note, issued on 23rd January, should be made available to the United States authorities for use in conjunction with discussions with members of the State Department.

2. The Note is at present classified "SECRET-UK EYES ONLY". It will be recalled that it was prepared as briefing for discussions with Kenyan Ministers and also as intelligence background for a paper then being prepared by the Defence Planning Staff. It was because of the limited purpose of the Note that distribution to the United States authorities was not considered in detail.

3. Departments are now requested to state -

(a) whether there is source objection to any of the information contained in the Note being passed to the United States - or Canadian - authorities and, if so, what amendments, if any, would be required before the "UK EYES ONLY" marking could be removed;

(b) whether there is political objection to the Note being passed to the Americans and Canadians (the Commonwealth Office may perhaps wish to delete references to "questions posed by the Commonwealth Office" in the last sentence of paragraph 1 of the Annex and in the title of the Appendix).

4. I propose that the Note be passed to the United States and Canadian authorities, subject to any deletions which Departments may have requested by Noon on Monday, 20th February 1967.

(Signed) J.P. FOSTER

for Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

14th February 1967

DISTRIBUTION

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JIS 'B' Team
COS Secretariat

CONFIDENTIAL

19

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

JIC(67)(N) 11

COPY NO. 58

23rd January 1967

UK EYES ONLY

CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

21/2. 1971.

JIC NOTE

THE SOMALI MILITARY THREAT TO KENYA

The attached JIC Note has been approved out of Committee.

(Signed) M.E. GREEN

for Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

23rd January 1967.

DISTRIBUTION

JIC

(97792)

Annex to JIC(67)(N) 11

THE SOMALI MILITARY THREAT TO KENYA

In this note we examine the organisation, disposition and equipment of the Somali Army and give an assessment of its capability. We then outline the organisation and disposition of the Kenya Army. Based on these points we make an assessment of the Somali military threat to Kenya. Replies to specific questions posed by the Commonwealth Office, following their discussion with Kenyan Ministers, are at Appendix.

The Somali Army

2. General. As a result of the Russian military aid agreement, signed in 1963, the Somalis have embarked on the complete reorganisation, re-equipment and retraining of their army. However, the programme for this has continually fallen behind, and it is at present intended that it should be completed by the end of this year, though this stage is in fact unlikely to be reached before late 1968. There is a Russian Military Training Team, some 200 strong, in the country.

3. Organisation. The intention is that the Somali National Army (SNA) (9,000 strong, with a target of 10,000 by 1968) should be organised into eight mechanised battle groups, each containing tanks and artillery. However, progress with this scheme has been very slow, and to date only two of the battle groups have moved beyond an intermediate stage in their re-organisation and re-training. Progress with the formation and training of the necessary administrative units is even slower.

4. The Army Air Force. The Air Force is a branch of the Army. Pilots have received training in the Soviet Union, and also in the Somali Republic by Soviet Instructors, but progress has been slow. It is possible that Somali pilots may by now have the ability to operate jet aircraft in a limited ground attack role against opportunity targets. However, we do not believe that they yet have the capacity to undertake a pre-planned set-piece ground attack, nor are they yet capable of carrying out interceptions of other aircraft. In addition, the only airfield in the southern part of the country at present suitable for the operation of jet aircraft (at Mogadishu) is at extreme range from the Kenyan border.

5. The Naval Wing. This also comes under the Army Commander. It is only 150 strong, manning at the most six patrol boats, and is based in the north of the country at Berbera.

6. Equipment. Virtually all equipment is of Soviet origin and includes T54 and T34 tanks, armoured personnel carriers, field and air defence guns, and MiG 15 and MiG 17 aircraft. Somalis appear to be very slow to learn technical skills. Serviceability is assessed as poor, there is a general lack of maintenance, and equipment has been misused.

7. Morale. A Soviet military mission in mid-1966 is reported to have noted an atmosphere of apathy among both officers and men, which manifests itself in resistance to prolonged training programmes together with continual cases of collective indiscipline. Recent reports point to considerable dissension amongst the more senior officers. Overall, morale is assessed at best to be only fair to good.

8. Dispositions. The Somalis appear to be mainly concerned over the threat from Ethiopia. Only about a third of the Army is deployed opposite the Kenyan frontier, while priority in the training and re-equipment programme is being given to units in the north and centre of the country opposite Ethiopia.

9. Capabilities. Due to the slow progress with training, the difficulties with technical equipment, and low morale, the Somali Army does not have a capability commensurate with its potential in terms of equipment. We believe that it will not be able to conduct prolonged offensive operations for the next two years and possibly not for the two years thereafter, up to the end of 1970. It will however be able, during the next two years, to deal with any internal security problem, defend its own borders, and perhaps make limited forays into neighbouring countries. However, in the context of limited forays we doubt its ability to move armour to the Kenyan border (even if the report is confirmed it has received eight tank transporters) and thereafter undertake offensive operations. The nearest armoured unit (at Mogadishu) is over 300 miles from the border; the terrain is rough with poor roads; tank crews are still in the early stages of their training and maintenance is poor.

The Kenyan Forces

10. The Kenyan Forces number some 5,000, organised as an infantry brigade group (three battalions) together with a small transport Air Force which is largely manned by RAF aircrew, and a Navy with three small patrol boats. The forces are commanded by a British officer and there is a substantial British training team. Morale is not high, and we suspect, though we have no firm evidence, that their efficiency and capability are declining. At least half the Army is permanently deployed in the Northern Frontier District, where it is engaged in operations against dissident Shifta,

who are armed and encouraged by the Somali Republic. There is a defence agreement with Ethiopia, and the Ethiopians could be expected to come to Kenya's assistance in the event of Somali aggression. It is not at present clear whether such assistance would decisively affect the issue.

Conclusions

11. In general, we concur with the conclusions of the previous JIC report on this subject - "The implications of Soviet Bloc Military Aid to the Somali Republic", JIC(66) 36.

12. In particular, we conclude that -

(a) The Somalis will not be able to mount prolonged offensive operations against Kenya before the end of 1968, and possibly not for a further two years thereafter.

(b) The Somalis may already have the capability to mount limited operations across the Kenyan border, but with only small forces. Although such attacks could be materially and politically damaging the political assessment of their likelihood (paras. 7-8 of Appendix)is relevant.

Appendix to Annex to JIC(67)(N) 11

REPLIES TO QUESTIONS POSED BY THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

I. Q. Has there been an intensification of Shifta activity in the last year?

A. Yes, and this has been reported periodically in the Weekly Survey of Intelligence.

II. Q. Are the Shifta using sophisticated weapons, such as plastic mines and modern automatic weapons?

A. The Shifta have been armed with automatic weapons for some time, though we have no evidence that they are particularly adept in their use; they have been using mines (including plastic mines) and explosives for the past six months, and have inflicted considerable damage and casualties. The weapons and mines that have been used are not particularly modern, and are similar to those employed by dissidents elsewhere in Africa, including the Congo, Mozambique and Rhodesia.

III. Q. How far are the Somali armed forces involved in the Shifta's training and operations?

A. We do not know how much the SNA is involved in the training of Shifta, but what training is carried out is sponsored by the SNA and Somali Police. There are a number of Shifta training camps in Somali Territory, adjacent to the border with Kenya. We know of no direct Somali military participation in Shifta operations in Kenya; though the Kenyans claim to have information to the contrary. we can neither confirm nor refute it. However, there is little doubt that the Shifta get their weapons and ammunition through the Somali forces.

IV. Q. What is the present amount of Russian and UAR equipment in the Somali Republic? Is the build up going on? Do we accept the figures of tanks, tank transporters, fighters and destroyers given recently by the Kenyan Minister of Agriculture? What radar facilities do they have?

A. (a) There is virtually no UAR equipment in the Somali Republic.

(b) Russian supplies have tailed off considerably during the past six months. This is probably due partly to Somali inability to absorb what they already hold, a point which must have been quite apparent to the visiting Russian military mission in mid-1966, and partly to the fact that we believe that deliveries are about 80 per cent complete.

(97792)

(c) Tanks - holding are 20+ T 54 and 80+ T 34.
Tank Transporters - possibly 8 have arrived but their location is unknown.
Fighter aircraft - holdings are 8 MiG 15 and 8 MiG 17.
There are no known UAR pilots.
Destroyers - None are held, the Somalis could not man them if they were, and we think it most unlikely that the UAR would provide such craft in the foreseeable future, or that the Russians would permit it.

(d) The Somalis have an early warning radar at Mogadishu. When they have learnt to fly their fighter aircraft, and when they have learnt to operate the radar, then the latter can be used to control the aircraft on operations and to assist in the interception of hostile aircraft. In addition, there are, throughout the country, air defence artillery units which have a radar facility. There has been a recent report of a large Russian sponsored radar station on the extreme north-east tip of the country; this could in no way be directed at Kenya, and we believe it could be connected with Russian space activities.

V. Q. Do we think that developments in the Horn of Africa, such as our forthcoming departure from Aden, the possible death of the Emperor of Ethiopia, or a flare-up of the French Somaliland problem, might make the Somalis and their Soviet and UAR backers more disposed to escalate the war against Kenya? In particular, might the Somali Government try to seize the town of Mandera, just inside the Kenya border (as the Americans are said to have warned), as a lever to help them in their elections due in May or June this year?

A. The claim of the Somali Republic for self determination for the Somali peoples of north-east Kenya, and the activities of the Somali Shifta within the Kenya border, which are supported and assisted by the Somali Republican Government, derive very largely from ethnic considerations. Somali/Kenyan relations are therefore chiefly conditioned by the Somali Government's pursuit of their "Greater Somalia" policy, but external factors may have some effect upon developments on the border.

2. Aden

It would be surprising if a British withdrawal from Aden did not have some ultimate effect on Kenya/Somali relations. The exact effect, however, is unpredictable at present, since much will depend on whether a Federal Government of moderate complexion can be successfully established in South Arabia or whether the territory falls under UAR domination. Irrespective of the outcome in South Arabia, the closure of the British base in Aden might lead the Somalis to believe that British ability to come to the aid of Kenya, in the event of an attack from Somalia, was substantially reduced thereby. In this sense, it could be argued that the Somalis might be disposed to take greater risks with the Kenyans. We believe, however, that the Somali Republican Government would continue to assume that British relations with the Kenya Government are manifestly so close that Britain would not hesitate to reinforce Kenya in the event of an all-out Somali attack. The British departure from Aden is therefore unlikely to be a major factor conditioning Somali attitudes towards Kenya.

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African hostility has led the Somali Government to attempt to better their relations with the Arab world generally. However, we have no evidence that relations with the UAR have become particularly friendly or that Cairo propaganda now favours the "Greater Somalia" cause. Even if South Arabia falls under UAR domination after the British withdrawal, it does not necessarily follow that UAR support for increased Somali pressure upon Kenya would develop. We believe that the UAR's pre-occupations elsewhere and political judgment may disincline them from closer involvement with the Somali regime which is generally unpopular elsewhere in Africa.

4. The Soviet Union

The Soviet Union's present policy appears to be to avoid involvement in disputes between African States. They are therefore likely to use what influence their substantial military aid to the Somali Government gives them to counsel restraint. In particular we would not expect them to permit Russian personnel to take part in offensive operations against Kenya. While it is an important aim of the Soviet Union to obtain a position of substantial influence in the Middle East and Africa, support for the Somali Republic is perhaps a poor instrument for this purpose. The Somali Republic is neither wholly Arab nor wholly African and, for the very reason that it is on bad terms with its more influential neighbours, Ethiopia and Kenya, is an unsound base on which to build a

position of influence in Africa. There have been signs that the Soviet Union is becoming increasingly aware of this consideration, and thus of the risk to their position elsewhere of too close involvement with Somali adventures. We believe that deliveries under the military aid agreement between the Soviet Union and the Somali Republic are virtually complete and we have no evidence that any fresh agreement has been made.

5. The Death of the Emperer of Ethiopia

The effect of the death of the Emperor of Ethiopia is difficult to estimate. Within Ethiopia our present view is that the Crown Prince would probably succeed peacefully to the throne, and stability would be maintained thereafter. But we cannot be sure of this, and the situation within Ethiopia certainly contains the seeds of revolution. In the event of internal disturbances in Ethiopia, we think it possible that the Somali Republic might take advantage of the situation to improve its position as regards the Haud, but, although in the case of such disturbance the exact course of events is unpredictable, we see no prima facie reason why the situation should lead to an escalation of Somali activity against Kenya.

6. French Somaliland

The French seem confident that the referendum in French Somaliland on 19th March will go in favour of continued association with France. If so it is difficult to predict the Somali Government's reaction. It is possible that public attention would be focussed on the continuing "colonial" status of French Somaliland and that there might in consequence be a reduction in Somali support for Shifta activity in Kenya. On the other hand the Somali Government might be tempted to direct attention away from French Somaliland and towards the Ogaden and Kenya.

7. Likelihood of Increased Somali Pressure against Kenya

Our information about affairs within the Somali Republic is too scanty to allow a sound judgment of the probabilities, but it is possible that the Somali Government might feel it necessary to demonstrate some progress in the direction of "Greater Somalia", in order to influence the result of the Presidential elections which are due to be held in the summer. The town of Mandera, only one mile over the border with Kenya might be seen as a tempting target but this appears to us to be no more than speculation by the Kenyan Ministers and we know of no basis for the alleged American belief that the town might be seized by Somali forces. Nor have we any evidence which supports the Kenya fear that a more extreme government would be installed in the Somali Republic after the Presidential elections. Our

impression has been that Abdirazak, the present Prime Minister, is firmly in control and maintains his tacit alliance with President Osman which should lead to the latter's re-election. However, it is possible that Communist money might be successfully employed to bribe their National Assembly to elect a more extreme President who might then exercise his power under the Constitution in certain circumstances to dissolve the Assembly. The General Election which followed could then return a new Assembly prepared to tolerate a more extreme Government.

8. On balance we would think it more likely that the Somalis will continue to operate by supporting the Shifta bands as they have done up to now rather than by a direct military attack upon Kenya.

18 (19)

EXTRACT from J. I C. (67) 3rd. MEETING held on 19.1.67.

SECRET

217/2
197/1.

2. SOMALI THREAT TO KENYA

MR. WALSH ATKINS said that Ministers would be meeting certain visiting Kenya Ministers in the middle of next week. For briefing purposes, there was a requirement for a JIC Note on the Somali threat to Kenya, to be accompanied if possible by a sanitized version for handing over to the visitors.

The following points were made in discussion -

(a) The Chiefs of Staff had expressed a similar requirement for a JIC Note for use by the Defence Planning Staff.

(b) Arrangements had been made for the Africa CIG to meet at 3.15 p.m. that day to prepare, with the aid of the Joint Intelligence Staff, a draft note for clearance out of Committee by 11.00 a.m. Monday, 23rd January 1967.

(c) It was in the Kenyans' interest to create as much alarm as possible in the minds of HMG.

(d) There was little doubt that the Somali armed forces had received much modern equipment. The question was what use they could make of it and the possible effect of any incursion into Kenya of which they might be capable.

(e) Kenyan anxiety was related not only to the growth of Somalia's armed forces but also to the possibility of Soviet and UAR nationals manning aircraft and ships on behalf of Somalia and to Kenyan doubts of the continuing worth of their defence agreement with Ethiopia once the Emperor had left the political scene.

The Committee -

Took note.

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE,
DOWNING STREET, LONDON, S.W.1.

16 January, 1917.

With the Compliments

of

[illegible]

217/2.

RECEIVED
18 JAN 1967
J. I. C. (A)

17

S E C R E T

2.EA.43/37/1

17 January, 1967.

The Chiefs of Staff this afternoon considered the minute from the Commonwealth Secretary to the Defence Secretary of 11 January about Kenya's request for some sort of an assurance by us against Somalia. I telephoned you this morning to let you know of the interview between two visiting Kenya Ministers and our Minister of State on Friday afternoon, which led us to think that it would be useful to put in hand urgently an examination of the Kenyan information about the build-up in Somalia with a view to briefing our Ministers and possibly giving something to the Kenyans when they call on the Commonwealth and Defence Secretaries on 25 January. I understand that the Chiefs of Staff at their meeting invited DCDS(I) to put in hand a fresh assessment of the Somali threat quickly, so we are all at one.

2. I am now enclosing a copy of the record of the conversation last Friday, together with a memorandum prepared by our High Commissioner in Nairobi. You will see from these documents that the Kenyans, and MacKenzie in particular, strongly fear that the Shifta problem may escalate into a major, well equipped Somali attack on Kenya.

3. We should very much like a note prepared through the J.I.C. machinery for the use of our Ministers in the further meeting on 25 January commenting on the points made by the Kenyans. We think that the note might cover in particular:-

(a) Has there been an intensification of Shifta activity in the last year?

(b) Are the Shifta using sophisticated weapons, such as plastic mines and modern automatic weapons?

(c) How far are the Somali armed forces involved in the Shifta's training and operations?

3 (d)

Air Chief Marshal Sir Alfred Earle,
K.B.E., C.B.,
Ministry of Defence.

(d) What is the present amount of Russian and U.A.R. equipment in Somalia, and is the build-up going on? Are the figures of tanks, fighters, destroyers and radar stations given by MacKenzie correct?

(e) Do you think that developments in the Horn of Africa, such as our forthcoming departure from Aden, the possible death of the Emperor of Ethiopia, or a flare-up of the French Somaliland problem, might make the Somalis and their Soviet and U.A.R. backers more disposed to escalate the war against Kenya? In particular, might the Somali Government try to seize the town of Mandera, just inside the Kenya border (as the Americans are said to have warned), as a lever to help them in the elections due in May or June this year? (5)

4. Many of these questions were of course considered in JIC(66)36(Final) of 30 June 1966 - The Implications of Soviet Bloc military aid to the Somali Republic. We think that the note might carefully examine the conclusions of this report regarding Somalia to see whether they are still valid. While the note is being prepared, it would be useful to consider simultaneously (to save time) whether there could be a sanitised version drafted for handing over to Gichuru and MacKenzie in continuation of the sanitised version of JIC(66)36 - JIC 654/66.

5. We will, I fear, need this note by the end of the week, so that it can be fitted into the briefs being prepared for our Ministers.

6. I am sending a copy of this letter with its enclosures to Richards at J.I.C., to whom I have already spoken on the telephone. I am also sending copies to Denis Greenhill and Alan Crick.

L. B. Walsh Atkins

CONFIDENTIAL

Record of a conversation between the Minister of State, Commonwealth Office, Mr. George Thomas, and the Kenya Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Mackenzie and the Minister of Finance, Mr. Gichuru at the Commonwealth Office on Friday, 13 January, 1967 at 3.30 p.m.

The following were present:

Mr. E.G. Norris
Mr. L.B. Walsh-Atkins
Mr. D.A. MacLeod

Mr. Gichuru opened the conversation by stressing that this was a courtesy call, and that he and Mr. Mackenzie looked forward to the opportunity of discussing various problems, particularly the threat to Kenya's security by Somalia, on their return from the United States. Whereas in the past, Britain's general assurances of support were good enough, the time was coming when Kenya could no longer afford to buy the expensive military equipment which was proving to be required if Kenya was to continue to cope with the Shifta problem, and a more specific British undertaking was being sought. The Minister of State informed the Kenya Ministers that they would have the Prime Minister's reply to President Kenyatta on this subject when they returned from the United States.

2. Mr. Mackenzie said that he was glad that the Prime Minister's answer would be ready soon. At their meeting with the Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence on 25 January they hoped to be able to produce actual pictures of the Russian equipment with which the army of Somalia was now being equipped. By early 1968 it was forecast that the Somali army would be 20,000 strong and would have modern Russian tanks, fighter aircraft and ships. Already the Somalis had taken delivery of 36 T34 tanks, 6 Mig fighters and 2 destroyers. The destroyers, which were delivered only last Monday, were passed on by the UAR who had received them from the Russians. They in turn had received more modern replacements from the USSR. Mr. Mackenzie maintained that the crews were 95% UAR and 5% Russian. They would be training Somali crews to take over eventually. Somalis too would succeed the UAR pilots of the Mig fighters. In addition Somalia had already got 12 "self-propelled tank carriers" thus invalidating the old assessment that the desert provided a natural barrier between Somalia and Kenya.

3. Mr. Mackenzie said that as a result of the provision through the UAR of Russian equipment for the Somali army, the Shifta had been able to inherit a large amount of modern automatic weapons from the Somalis. The Somalis had been training and leading Shifta patrols, as the Kenya Government had learnt from their Sudas, who had infiltrated the Somali forces. Mr. Mackenzie said that during the last three weeks between £25,000 and £28,000 worth of damage had been done each week by mine explosions in Northern Kenya. Much of the information about the Somali threat had been passed on to the British security services, and had been published in East African newspapers. Mr. Thomas asked about the extent of loss of life, which Mr. Mackenzie estimated as being about 4 to 1 in Kenya's

/favour

favour. Mr. Mackenzie paid tribute to the work that had been done already by Major-General Penfold, whom he said had fitted in extremely well and had already earned the Kenya Government's admiration.

4. About their visit to the United States, Mr. Mackenzie said that they were anxious to enlist American aid and particularly hoped to obtain equipment and aircraft for the police. They would also be visiting Canada where they hoped to meet the Prime Minister. They already had two Canadian Caribou transport aircraft and hoped to obtain another.

5. Mr. Thomas was told that the cost of the present emergency in Kenya was about £5 million a year, which was approximately 10% of Kenya's budget.

6. Mr. Thomas asked whether the Kenya Government intended to take the dispute to the United Nations. Mr. Mackenzie replied that there was already a build-up of tensions in the Horn of Africa in anticipation of Britain's withdrawal from Aden. He mentioned reports which had appeared just before Christmas of an attempted coup in Ethiopia. Although Kenya had a treaty with Ethiopia, it was valid, so far as Kenya was concerned, only so long as the Emperor was in a position to honour it. At the instigation of the UAR, Mr. Mackenzie continued, Kenya is being accused of discriminating against her Moslems, and President Kenyatta had agreed that the Vice President and others should visit Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Jordan to explain Kenya's position to them. After that it might be possible to take the matter to the U.N.

7. Mr. Mackenzie made the further point that there would be elections in Somalia in May or June this year. In his view the present moderate Government in power would be replaced by a government of extremists financed by money from the UAR and the USSR. He had been told by the Americans that the Somalis might try to seize the town of Mandera, just inside the Kenya border, as a lever to help them in the elections. Mr. Mackenzie implied that the UAR with Russian help intended to take advantage of Britain's withdrawal from Aden to direct Somali attacks on Kenya.

8. In discussion, Mr. Mackenzie commented that President Nyerere would have had a fit if the Somali destroyers had come near Dar-es-Salaam, but he did not appear to worry about them threatening Kenya. He attributed this sort of jealousy to Kenya's prosperity and successful economic development.

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SECRET
EA 43/37/1

17 January, 1967.

The Chiefs of Staff this afternoon considered the minute from the Commonwealth Secretary to the Defence Secretary of 11 January about Kenya's request for some more of our helicopters to be sent to Somalia. I will leave you to comment, to let you know of the discussion between the visiting Kenya Ministers and our Ministers of State on Friday afternoon, which led us to think that it would be useful to get in hand urgently an examination of the Kenyan information about the build-up in Somalia with a view to briefing our Ministers and possibly giving something to the Kenyans when they call on the Commonwealth and Defence Secretaries on 23 January. I understand that the Chiefs of Staff at their meeting will wish(?) to get in hand a fresh assessment of the Somali threat quickly, so we are all at one.

2. I am now enclosing a copy of the record of the conversation last Friday, together with a memorandum prepared by our High Commissioner in Nairobi. You will see from these documents that the Kenyans, and Mr Malik in particular, strongly fear that the Shifta problem may escalate into a major, well equipped Somali attack on Kenya.

3. We should very much like a note prepared through the Joint Machinery for the use of our Ministers in the further meeting on 23 January commenting on the points made by the Kenyans. We think that the note might cover in particular:-

(a) Has there been an intensification of Shifta activity in the last year?

(b) Are the Shifta using sophisticated weapons, such as plastic mines and modern automatic weapons?

(c) How far are the Somali armed forces involved in the Shifta's training and operations?

I (a)

Air Chief Marshal Sir Alfred Earle,
K.B.E., C.B.,
Ministry of Defence.

(d) What is the present amount of Russian and Soviet equipment in Somalia, and is the existing pipeline of arms the figure of tanks, fighters, helicopters and radar stations given by the Somalis correct?

(e) Do you think that developments in the form of Soviet, and our forthcoming departure from Aden, the possible death of the Emperor of Ethiopia, or a flare-up of the French Somaliland problem, call into question the Somalis and their Soviet and Arab friends' reasons why they need to escalate the war against Kenya? In particular, might the Somali Government try to seize the port of Kismayu, just inside the Kenya border (as the Somalis are said to have wanted), as a lever to help them in the elections due in May or June this year.

2. Some of these questions were of course considered in JIC(66)30(Final) of 30 June 1966 - The Implications of Soviet Arms Military Aid to the Somali Republic. We think that we ought carefully examine the conclusions of this report before we come to see whether they are still valid. While the note is being prepared, it would be useful to consider simultaneously (to save time) whether there could be a shortened version drafted for sending over to Dickens and Watkinson in continuation of the shortened version of JIC(66)30 - JIO 66/46.

3. I will, I hope, need this note by the end of the week, so that it can be fitted into the briefs being prepared for our visitors.

4. I am sending a copy of this letter with its enclosures to Richards at D.I.C., to whom I have already spoken on the telephone. I am also sending copies to Denis Greenhill and Alan Crick.

L. F. Walk tkins

CONFIDENTIAL

Record of a conversation between the Minister of State, Commonwealth Office, Mr. George Thomas, and the Kenya Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Mackenzie and the Minister of Finance, Mr. Gichuru at the Commonwealth Office on Friday, 13 January, 1967 at 3.30 p.m.

The following were present:

Mr. E.G. Norris
Mr. L.B. Walsh-Atkins
Mr. D.A. MacLeod

Mr. Gichuru opened the conversation by stressing that this was a courtesy call, and that he and Mr. Mackenzie looked forward to the opportunity of discussing various problems, particularly the threat to Kenya's security by Somalia, on their return from the United States. Whereas in the past, Britain's general assurances of support were good enough, the time was coming when Kenya could no longer afford to buy the expensive military equipment which was proving to be required if Kenya was to continue to cope with the Shifta problem, and a more specific British undertaking was being sought. The Minister of State informed the Kenya Ministers that they would have the Prime Minister's reply to President Kenyatta on this subject when they returned from the United States.

2. Mr. Mackenzie said that he was glad that the Prime Minister's answer would be ready soon. At their meeting with the Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence on 25 January they hoped to be able to produce actual pictures of the Russian equipment with which the army of Somalia was now being equipped. By early 1968 it was forecast that the Somali army would be 20,000 strong and would have modern Russian tanks, fighter aircraft and ships. Already the Somalis had taken delivery of 36 T34 tanks, 6 Mig fighters and 2 destroyers. The destroyers, which were delivered only last Monday, were passed on by the UAR who had received them from the Russians. They in turn had received more modern replacements from the USSR. Mr. Mackenzie maintained that the crews were 95% UAR and 5% Russian. They would be training Somali crews to take over eventually. Somalis too would succeed the UAR pilots of the Mig fighters. In addition Somalia had already got 12 "self-propelled tank carriers" thus invalidating the old assessment that the desert provided a natural barrier between Somalia and Kenya.

3. Mr. Mackenzie said that as a result of the provision through the UAR of Russian equipment for the Somali army, the Shifta had been able to inherit a large amount of modern automatic weapons from the Somalis. The Somalis had been training and leading Shifta patrols, as the Kenya Government had learnt from their Sudas, who had infiltrated the Somali forces. Mr. Mackenzie said that during the last three weeks between £25,000 and £28,000 worth of damage had been done each week by mine explosions in Northern Kenya. Much of the information about the Somali threat had been passed on to the British security services, and had been published in East African newspapers. Mr. Thomas asked about the extent of loss of life, which Mr. Mackenzie estimated as being about 4 to 1 in Kenya's

/favour

favour. Mr. Mackenzie paid tribute to the work that had been done already by Major-General Penfold, whom he said had fitted in extremely well and had already earned the Kenya Government's admiration.

4. About their visit to the United States, Mr. Mackenzie said that they were anxious to enlist American aid and particularly hoped to obtain equipment and aircraft for the police. They would also be visiting Canada where they hoped to meet the Prime Minister. They already had two Canadian Caribou transport aircraft and hoped to obtain another.

5. Mr. Thomas was told that the cost of the present emergency in Kenya was about £5 million a year, which was approximately 10% of Kenya's budget.

6. Mr. Thomas asked whether the Kenya Government intended to take the dispute to the United Nations. Mr. Mackenzie replied that there was already a build-up of tensions in the Horn of Africa in anticipation of Britain's withdrawal from Aden. He mentioned reports which had appeared just before Christmas of an attempted coup in Ethiopia. Although Kenya had a treaty with Ethiopia, it was valid, so far as Kenya was concerned, only so long as the Emperor was in a position to honour it. At the instigation of the UAR, Mr. Mackenzie continued, Kenya is being accused of discriminating against her Moslems, and President Kenyatta had agreed that the Vice President and others should visit Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Jordan to explain Kenya's position to them. After that it might be possible to take the matter to the U.N.

7. Mr. Mackenzie made the further point that there would be elections in Somalia in May or June this year. In his view the present moderate Government in power would be replaced by a government of extremists financed by money from the UAR and the USSR. He had been told by the Americans that the Somalis might try to seize the town of Mandera, just inside the Kenya border, as a lever to help them in the elections. Mr. Mackenzie implied that the UAR with Russian help intended to take advantage of Britain's withdrawal from Aden to direct Somali attacks on Kenya.

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S E C R E T

Kenya: Defence Pact

Introduction

The Kenyans are seeking a private informal assurance that we would come to their assistance in the event of a large scale attack by Somalia. The problem of incursions by Somali guerillas (shifta) in the North Eastern areas of Kenya existed long before independence in 1963. Since then the shifta have been exploited by the Somali Government to further their Greater Somalia policy. The Kenyans fear, particularly because of the intensified use of sophisticated plastic mines during 1966, that there is a danger of the shifta problem escalating into a major attack. The Kenyans are also daunted at the thought of an indefinite commitment against shifta which is costing them £5.5m. in the current year and the cost of which is likely to increase. Their morale might sink dangerously low if they were left alone in the knowledge that Ethiopia had at least the moral support of, as well as military hardware supplied by, the United States, while Somalia enjoyed similar facilities from the Russians.

S E C R E T

2. H.M.G. are being asked to confirm privately and informally a commitment which the Kenyans believe already exists and which was expressed in qualified form by the Prime Minister and Defence Secretary on 11 November at their meeting with Messrs. Njonjo and McKenzie:

> "The Defence Secretary said that we were carefully watching the military build up in Somalia but our estimate was that they would not be capable for some considerable time of anything more than the current level of relatively small scale skirmishing. This was really a political question of the extent to which Kenya was seeking a formal or public commitment from Britain. As he understood it, our position at present (and this he believed was probably what Mr. Njonjo had also intended) was that we certainly did not preclude the possibility of coming to Kenya's assistance, but this was not automatic; nor were we under any formal obligation to do so. The Prime Minister assented; our general position was that we sought to help Commonwealth countries to the limit of our powers, though naturally each case had individual characteristics and we would not, for example, be prepared to help one Commonwealth country against another e.g. the Indo-Pakistan conflict."

/The Threat

The Threat

3. In June 1963, J.I.C. assessed the danger of Somali expansion as largely illusory. What is not illusory, however, is the drain on the Kenyan budget represented by the mounting cost of military, paramilitary and police operations against the shifta together with a casualty toll during the twelve months ending 31 October 1966 alone of 14 members of the Kenyan security forces killed and 103 wounded as against 745 shifta killed and 228 wounded. Additionally 185 Kenyan civilians were killed and 153 wounded. Although those figures are low, operations in the current year will have involved a disproportionately high cost of £5.5m. having cost £3.3m. in 1965/66. On present form these costs can be expected to increase further.

4. Kenyan apprehensions are exacerbated by a general fear of instability in the area. They believe that Russian, Chinese and East German infiltration in Zambia and Tanzania make her southerly neighbours unreliable. They do not feel confident of President Obote as a firmly established ally in Uganda on their western

/frontier

frontier. They are particularly anxious about the prospect of British evacuation from Aden in 1968. Above all is the existing menace of shifts. This menace colours Kenyan anxieties about reports of an increased Soviet arms build up and the construction of, for example, radio stations on the coast of Somalia. The Kenyans, to some extent egged on by the Israelis, identify their aspirations with those of Somalia and they are distinctly worried at the indefinite loan to Somalia of two destroyers manned by Egyptians. Further doubts centre on prospects for Ethiopia if and when the Emperor is removed from the scene and on the future of Djibouti. The Kenyans fear that if France casts adrift Djibouti, Somalia would invade that small defenceless territory. The Kenyans are preoccupied about whether Ethiopia could repel a Somali invasion of Djibouti and whether Kenya herself would be obliged to go to Ethiopia's assistance.

5. The factors constituting a threat to stability in the Horn of Africa may seem diffuse in the long term; in the short term however, circumstances have combined to create a state of acute anxiety in Kenya and a severe drain on her economy.

/Internal ..

Arguments against a British presence

6. One major disadvantage of an assurance by H.M.G. to Kenya is that it would be an open ended commitment. It is impossible to forecast the duration of the Kenya/Somali dispute which ultimately can only have a political, and not a military solution. Moreover, it is difficult to assess the cost of British support if, contrary to expectations, it were invoked. There is also the difficulty of forecasting when such an attack might take place or when hostilities between the two countries might come to a head. This would necessitate contingency plans with all that these involve.

7. There is also the risk that, in the security of a British assurance, the Kenya Government would be tempted to escalate their operations against the shifta, to the point of provoking Somalia into a large-scale attack. It would be necessary to devise machinery by which the source and scale of aggression in the event of Somali/Kenyan hostilities could be clearly and specifically identified.

In favour of a British presence

8. H.M.G. at present enjoy staging rights for the R.A.F. in Nairobi at Eastleigh Airport and

/exceptionally

exceptionally at Embakasi Airport. Because of special facilities which exist at Embakasi - a first-class International Airport - the exceptional rights there are particularly valuable and Kenyan goodwill will be required for these exceptional rights to continue. H.M.G. also enjoy mooring, victualling and refuelling facilities for U.K. ships at Mombasa (which may become a more strategic point between the Mediterranean and Singapore when Flag Officer Middle East moves his headquarters from Aden to Bahrein); and our Land Forces enjoy training rights in Kenya. All these rights flow from Paragraph 2 of the 1964 Memorandum of Intention and Understanding which in theory remains valid indefinitely, but in practice Kenyan goodwill will also be needed if we are to retain present facilities for the R.N. and the Army. During 1966 President Kenyatta was particularly sympathetic to H.M.G.'s policy over Rhodesia and given British goodwill and consistent adherence to the Six Principles he will probably continue to be so.

9. As seen from Nairobi the stability of Kenya is crucial to the stability of East Africa. H.M.G. are giving her large sums in capital aid and technical

/assistance.

assistance. She represents a safe haven for substantial British investment, a good potential export market and a home for about 29,000 British subjects (in addition to 120,000 Asians with U.K. passports).

10. Given our assessment that a Somali attack on Kenya is highly improbable, what the Kenyans are really requesting is psychological and moral support from us which will enable them to bear the annual shifta bill with better heart. They would prefer an assurance from the British rather than from, for example, the United States, even if it were forthcoming from the latter which is unlikely.

11. A distinction must be drawn between a short term military deterrent and a long term solution which can only be achieved politically. Although in the long run the Kenyans' best policy may be painstakingly to build up a case history of Somali incursions which they can take to the U.N. and O.A.U.; in the short term H.M.G. might unnecessarily demoralise the Kenya Government at a crucial stage in its economic development plans by giving them anything less than a private assurance on

/the lines that

the lines that Britain would not stand idly by if she were the victim of aggression. In addition, H.M.G. might provide advice on how best to produce a case history of Somali/shifta incursions to be taken eventually to the O.A.U. or the U.N.

14. Most Kenyans (and probably most Somalis) already believe that an Anglo/Kenyan defence agreement exists so that private confirmation of a limited assurance to the Kenyans would not be likely to be provocative abroad (e.g. to the Russians in Somalia) but would be confined to bolstering Kenyan morale. The Kenyan/Somali misapprehension already serves as a deterrent and any public declaration to the contrary could have an encouraging effect on Somali/U.A.R. expansionist policies.

15. The confirmation informally of support for one of our most co-operative Commonwealth partners in Africa may be less expensive than the increased financial, personnel and budgetary assistance which the Kenyans will otherwise feel obliged to request for their Armed Forces over the next few years. Overt logistical assistance would moreover be more likely to provoke escalation in Somalia than a private confirmation of support.

/Conclusion

Conclusion

14. A compromise form of assurance which would probably be acceptable to the Kenyans and which might serve as an anti-Somali deterrent might be to steer a middle course between the general assurance that H.M.G. would find it difficult to stand by when a Commonwealth partner was attacked on the one hand and a formal Anglo/Kenyan defence agreement on the other hand. A middle way assurance might be to the effect that H.M.G. would not stand by while Kenya was subjected to unprovoked external aggression. This assurance would need to be accompanied by an unequivocal caveat by H.M.G. that such assistance would not be forthcoming in the event of hostilities which were provoked by the Kenyans. The presence of a British Chief of Defence Staff, Major General Penfold, would be of assistance in identifying the source of aggression.

15. The British stake in Kenya is substantial, the present Kenyan request is an extension of the general principle of Commonwealth partnership. A great deal of Kenyan goodwill will be required for us to maintain our defence rights outlined in paragraph 8 above as well as the continuation of the favourable

/climate

SECRET

climate which President Kenyatta has created for British policies and interests since independence in 1963.

British High Commission,
Nairobi.

14 January, 1967.

SECRET

E.R.

SECRET

SIR BURKE TREND

01005
24 OCT 1966

16

21/2.

Your minute of 14th October on the slip of paper below. There are two aspects to this: (i) the Somali threat; and (ii) the Soviet threat. Both are covered in the attached JIC report.

The Somali threat seems to me to concern Kenya primarily and Ethiopia secondly, and I suggest that United Kingdom interest in it is not large (since I doubt if the threat is such as to endanger the security of Kenya as a whole, even if its Northern frontier district is in some danger). On this aspect you will see that the JIC conclude that although the supply of Soviet arms has given the Somali Republic some advan tage both in equipment and man-power over the Kenyan/Ethiopian forces, the armed forces of all three are in general capable of no more than dealing with internal security and could not conduct long offensive operations (paragraphs 24 - 27).

The Soviet threat i.e. the extent to which by their assistance to the Somali Republic the Soviet Union could establish its influence in this strategically important part of Africa, is of much greater concern to us. The conclusion of the JIC is, however, that the Russians have rather burned their fingers and may even wish to disengage to some extent (paragraphs 31-35).

I suggest, therefore, that there is no need for us to take action at this stage, though clearly we should keep a close watch on the situation.

T.R.

(P. ROGERS)

M. Rogers 24/10

20th October, 1966

Thank you. I don't dissent: but we should keep a close watch on X, particularly if Rhodesia goes finally sour.

H.

25/10.

Mr Richards 26/X.
Mr Crick 27/10 26/10
Registry

Mr Haskey 25/10

Secretary of the Cabinet

Mr Rogers

Who is doing what about Somalia and the Soviet threat in the Horn of Africa?

PR 18/X

Mr Richards, 18/10

Mr Cricks. Minute attached. PR 18/10

Is there a record of the allocation of responsibilities "in the Horn" yet?

PR 17/10

F.R.

15

Mr. White

5

...

14

...

D. F. T. Brice

(D. F. T. Brice)

Mr. Richards, L.C.

T. S. Richards.

PAC
A 3867
13 OCT
MAIN REGISTRY
FILE NO.

14

217/2.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE VICE PRESIDENT OF KENYA AT NO.10 DOWNING STREET AT 3.50 P.M. ON WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1966

Present:-

The Prime Minister
The Commonwealth Secretary
Mr. A.M. Palliser

Mr. Joseph Murumbi,
The Kenya High Commissioner

Rhodesia

The Prime Minister said that he had received a friendly and helpful message from President Kenyatta. He would be replying to it that evening. He knew that the President had been having exchanges of views recently with his African neighbours about Rhodesia. The Prime Minister then described the present state of play over Rhodesia and the outcome of the Commonwealth Secretary's visit. It had perhaps been unfortunate in some respects that this had co-incided with Smith's Party Conference. But Smith had been left in no doubt that he now had to adhere to a time-table. We did not see much prospect of his accepting our terms. If he had not done so by November 30, we would go ahead at once to take the action envisaged in paragraphs 10A and B of the Commonwealth Communique.

The Commonwealth Secretary said that he thought November 11, the first anniversary of I.D.I., would be a crucial date; and the regime might indeed declare a republic on it. Mr. Murumbi asked whether in that case there was any need to wait until November 30 before going for mandatory sanctions at the United Nations. The

Prime Minister said that if Smith gave a clear rejection of our terms we naturally would not wait until November 30. But if he equivocated we would be willing to give him up to the full time limit. Mr. Murumbi repeated that he thought it very important that if Smith turned us down, we should act immediately at the United Nations. The Prime Minister said we had purposely referred at the Commonwealth Conference not to Smith rejecting our terms but to what would happen if he failed to accept them by the end of November. This was to avoid any possible doubt at that date over whether or not he had specifically rejected the terms. But if he did so reject them, then without doubt we should act rapidly at the United Nations.

The Commonwealth Secretary asked whether other African countries than those in the Commonwealth could be expected to agree to selective rather than comprehensive sanctions. Mr. Murumbi replied that he had gone to New York in some apprehension about the likely attitudes of other non-Commonwealth members of the African Group. But he had been pleased to see that most of them, and the French-speaking Africans in particular, had seemed satisfied with what had been achieved by the African Commonwealth members at Marlborough House, and felt that they had got the most they could have expected. There had been no criticism to his knowledge of the results obtained by the African Commonwealth. The Prime Minister said that if Smith rejected our terms we would go for sanctions on an agreed and joint basis with the other Commonwealth members of the Security Council. We were thinking in

terms of sanctions against a comprehensive list of Rhodesian exports. Although this still had to be confirmed by his colleagues, his preliminary view was that there would also and simultaneously have to be limited oil sanctions. The Government were also studying such further measures as might be taken at the same time against Rhodesia. These included action against Rhodesian passports, air transit rights and shipping. Mr. Murumbi said that he hoped there would also be a joint Commonwealth appeal to all countries still trading with Rhodesia to abandon this. These included countries such as Japan and Germany. Moreover, the more items that could be included on the list for sanctions, the better. Although, as he had said, the other African members of the United Nations seemed reasonably satisfied, there was no doubt that they would wish sanctions to be as comprehensive as possible.

There was then some discussion of the difficulties that would confront Botswana in the application of sanctions, particularly over the use of the railway for supplying Rhodesia. Mr. Murumbi expressed surprise that Sir Seretse Khama could accept the present position and, in reply to a question by the Prime Minister, admitted that Khama was not really regarded as a member of the African Group. Indeed he had never been fully "one of us" and the other Africans had always had reservations about him. Mr. Murumbi added that he had discussed Rhodesia with Mr. Dean Rusk and had urged on him the need for the Americans to bring maximum pressure to bear for a Rhodesian settlement.

South West Africa

Mr. Murumbi enquired about H.M.G.'s attitude. He had been disappointed by ~~Sir Hugh Foot's~~ Lord Caradon's statement at the United Nations. There were admittedly certain differences of view in the African Group itself ~~and~~ about how the situation should now be handled; and particularly about the financial implications of any attempt to arrange for the United Nations to take over the territory. Nevertheless, he hoped that H.M.G. would in general support the African stand against South Africa. The Prime Minister and the Commonwealth Secretary said that they were not completely up to date on the present progress of discussions in New York. The Foreign Secretary was there at the moment and would no doubt be keeping in dose touch with the situation.

Nigeria

The Prime Minister said that a very dangerous situation had developed with a total breakdown in the Army and in the Central Government. He feared that Nigeria might relapse not so much into regionalism as into pure tribalism. This of course was what Smith was always pleased to argue would happen in countries under African rule. Kenya at present seemed a welcome area of stability to disprove Smith's thesis.

Kenya - Somalia Relations

Mr. Murumbi said that President Kenyatta had asked him to raise this with the Prime Minister. They recognised that H.M.G., having no diplomatic relations with Somalia, could not act directly with the Somalia Government. But the situation in their north-eastern territories was becoming increasingly critical and the

additional cost of attempting to defend the area was laying a heavy and unwelcome burden on the Kenyan Budget. The Kenya Government had tried without success to talk to the Somalis. They had even held a meeting of the two Presidents at which the Somalis had agreed that they had no territorial claims against Kenya; but when it came to enshrining this in a communiqué, the talks broke down because the Somalis insisted upon inserting a clause about the need for self-determination for the peoples of Northern Kenya, and even the intervention of President Nyerere had been unavailing. Now the Soviet Union was pouring in arms and equipping Somalia with jet aircraft and Kenya's armed forces were totally inadequately equipped to meet such a threat. It seemed to him to involve dangers not only for Kenya but also for the West as a whole by posing a real Soviet threat to the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and even eventually the Persian Gulf. Mr. Murumbi then gave the Prime Minister a memorandum on the subject (copy attached). Kenya feared that the Somalis might before long feel strong enough to attack Ethiopia and expected that in that event they would also attack Kenya. But the Kenyans could not possibly resist such an attack. Present Kenyatta was seriously concerned at the threat and had asked him to urge on the Prime Minister the need for help. The Prime Minister undertook to study Mr. Murumbi's memorandum and to let the Kenya Government know in due course if we felt that we could do anything further. Mr. Murumbi suggested that we might be able to make representations to the Soviet Government. He had discussed this also with Mr. Rusk and at the latter's request would be sending him a full note with the latest information on the situation

He would send a copy of this also to the Prime Minister. The constant guerilla raids across the border from Somalia and the infiltration of trained men into Kenya posed an appallingly difficult problem. The Ferret armoured cars provided by Britain were invaluable for this work. But the guerillas were now equipped with an abundance of modern weapons and the situation was getting beyond Kenya's control. The Prime Minister said that he would be glad to receive the further paper promised by Mr. Murumbi. H.M.G. would carefully study the problem.

President Nyerere

The Prime Minister said that he thought President Kenyatta had exercised a helpful, moderating influence on Nyerere. Mr. Murumbi assented but said that we should not misjudge Nyerere. He was basically a moderate and helpful man. He had faced an exceptionally difficult task in handling the Zanzibar situation and Mr. Karume. But he had exerted a useful and constructive influence over Rhodesia and particularly on President Kaunda.

The Prime Minister asked for his greetings to be conveyed to President Kenyatta. He wished Mr. Murumbi well in his future career in business. Mr. Murumbi expressed his thanks. He said that his visit to the United Nations represented his last public performance for Kenya, unless, as was possible, President Kenyatta asked him to attend the forthcoming meeting of the O.A.U.

Mr. Murumbi left at 4.20 p.m.

Distribution.
Commonwealth Sec.
Foreign Sec.
Defence Sec.
Minister of Overseas Development

October 12, 1963

SOMALI KENYA RELATIONS

Prior to Kenya's independence in 1963, the British Government convened a conference in Rome to which were invited the representatives of the Somali and Kenya Governments to discuss the future of the North Eastern Province of Kenya. The North Eastern Province is an area of some 49,000 square miles inhabited by approximately 270,000 people who are mostly of Somali origin. At this conference the British Government made it clear to the Kenya and Somali Governments that they had no intention of dismembering any part of Kenya prior to her independence. The British Government also reiterated that if there were problems between Kenya and Somalia these should be settled by mutual consent.

The Somali claim to the whole of the Northern Frontier of Kenya - an area of some 45,000 square miles - was unjustified. The Northern Frontier of Kenya is not wholly populated by Somalis except for the North Eastern section. The Kenya Government were prepared to place the matter before the Organisation of African Unity for a decision, as a test case, as to the ownership of this area and we were prepared to abide by any decision of the Organisation of African Unity. The Somali Government's representatives rejected this proposition and instead put forward a counter suggestion on the following lines:-

1) That the whole of the Northern Frontier of Kenya should be administered jointly by the Kenya and Somali Governments or, failing this, by the United Nations.

2) If we were not prepared to accept this proposition they were withdrawing from the talks.

This left us with no alternative method of pursuing the matter further and the talks broke down.

At the invitation of President Osman, President Kenyatta visited Somalia on a State Visit in 1962 and the matter was again brought up by the Somali Government but we could reach no conclusions.

In the meantime, the Organisation of African Unity had decided, in view of the fact that when Africa was carved up by the European powers no consideration was given to ethnic groupings or boundaries, that if there were to be any territorial revisions to conform with ethnic boundaries there would be utter confusion throughout the whole of Africa. For instance, practically every African state has tribes straddled across its frontier into neighbouring territories. In Kenya we have tribes living on both sides of our borders with the Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, and Tanzania. The decision of the Organisation of African Unity was accepted by all African states but Somalia had certain reservations and this, it was implied, was because they were intending to pursue the matter of territorial claims, not only with Kenya, but also with Ethiopia and the French Government in respect of the Ogaden and Djibouti.

2/..

On our side I would like to recall that that portion of Kenya known as the Jubaland Province (see map on last page) extending from our present boundary to the Juba River in present day Somalia, was originally Kenya territory. It is still largely inhabited by Bantu peoples and not by Somalis. This area was ceded to the Italian Government in 1923 in return for Italian services during the First World War. The Kenya Government have accepted this transfer of land and have, up to now, not made any claim for this area to be returned to Kenya and have pledged to abide by the Organisation of African Unity's resolution pertaining to the acceptance of boundaries as at the time of independence.

In 1964 the Somali Government brought the matter before the Organisation of African Unity at their meeting in Dar es Salaam. The Organisation of African Unity decided that this was an internal problem between the Governments of Kenya and Somalia and therefore should be resolved mutually by both Governments and we were asked to discuss the matter between us.

Furthermore, on March 31st until April 2nd, 1966, Heads of State of Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, and Malawi met at a conference in Nairobi to encourage and promote greater co-operation and good neighbourliness among the participating countries.

The Somali Government approached President Nyerere stating that they had no territorial claim on Kenya and would therefore like President Nyerere to call a meeting of both sides in order to resolve our difficulties. President Osman, his Foreign Minister, and other officials were visiting Tanzania to commemorate the anniversary of independence and it was decided that the Kenya Government should take the opportunity of re-opening talks with the Somali Government. The Foreign Ministers of Kenya and Somalia met in Arusha and came to an agreement that Somalia had no territorial claims on Kenya. This paved the way for a meeting between Presidents Kenyatta and Osman at which the Somali Foreign Minister reversed his first stand and, while accepting that Somalia had no territorial claims on Kenya, nevertheless said they would like a further sentence added to the communique to the effect that Somalis in the North East of Kenya should have the right to self-determination.

, You will observe that the Somali addendum was a contradiction to their original agreement that they had no territorial claims on Kenya. Every effort was made to try to reach some agreement on this point but, even though President Nyerere himself made every effort to arrive at a compromise solution, we all failed and the talks broke down.

To sum up, I would like to reiterate that throughout the Continent of Africa tribes are straddled across the frontiers and unless we accept the boundaries as at the time of independence and if adjustments are to be made by force, then there will be utter chaos throughout the Continent of Africa.

Almost immediately Kenya attained her independence, the Somali Government armed her own citizens, and also Somalis from the Kenya side and they have waged a continual

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war against, not only Kenya Somalis, but also against the Kenya security forces and police who are there to maintain law and order. Somali tribesmen (who are known as shifta or armed gangsters) are continually committing murder and looting their own people in the area at the instigation and with the full support and arms and equipment from the Somali Government. Arms of Russian origin, of Eastern European origin and of Egyptian origin have been captured from Somali shifta. Prisoners who have been interrogated have admitted being trained, armed, supported, and financed by the Somali Government. There is a constant barrage of hostile propaganda emanating from Radio Somalia directed to the Somali peoples in the North Eastern area, inciting them to revolt. Propaganda has reached such a low level that filthy attacks have even been made upon the person of President Kenyatta and his Ministers. At the meeting which was held in Nairobi, to which I have already referred, the Heads of State of East and Central Africa pledged themselves not to engage in hostile and filthy propaganda. The Government of Somalia pledged themselves to this but almost immediately broke their promises and, even to this day, continue their hostile propaganda from Radio Somalia. The Kenya Government have not on any occasion since these attacks on our territory began invaded any part or attacked any Somali or Somali units across the border. Our troops and police force operate within Kenya to maintain, what is the right of any government, law and order.

Costs of maintaining our troops and police in the area have risen to 3.1 million pounds this year. Both countries are poor and can ill afford to waste such large sums of money which could otherwise be used in much nobler efforts of developing our countries and eliminating the scourges of poverty, illiteracy and disease. The Government of the Republic of Somalia, on attaining independence, embodied in their constitution a clause to unite within Somalia the five areas which are inhabited by Somalis and which they believe should be under one umbrella. These countries are:-

1) Former British Somaliland, now incorporated into the Somali Republic;

2) French Somaliland;

3) The Ogaden;

4) The Northern Frontier of Kenya;

5) Somalia itself.

To this end they devised a five-pointed star as their national emblem. Because the Somali Government have committed the tragic blunder of trying to unite all Somalis under one rule, should the people of Kenya have to pay for their mistakes?


Last year the Somali Government, armed with Russian weapons, attacked Ethiopia. Their folly had dire consequences and the Somali army was terribly defeated.

Today, and for some time in the past, the Somali Government have been receiving very large shipments of Russian arms; the Somali Air Force is piloted by Somali and Russian pilots and there are Russian army instructors.

4/..

All these provide a very formidable force out of all proportion to their internal security requirements. It is understood that the Russian Government are to provide one year's supply of petrol and other oils to the Government of the Republic of Somalia. All this indicates that the Somalis wish to obtain by force what is not theirs and are not prepared to live in peace with their neighbours. The demand to incorporate within Somalia all Somalis living outside rings a familiar bell: Nazi Germany, prior to launching a full scale attack on Europe which precipitated the Second World War, were claiming that all Germans all over Europe should come under the protection of the Fatherland.

The actions of the Somali Government in receiving, and the Russian Government in providing, military assistance to this part of Africa is creating a danger to world peace. So far African nations are attempting to keep the Cold War away from their borders, but the presence of Russian instructors, Russian air force men, and Russian arms in the Horn of Africa would create a dangerous situation, not only to Kenya but also to Ethiopia and to other neighbouring territories. The Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa can also be a serious threat at some future date to movements within the Red Sea and the Suez Canal and a serious threat to Western oil interests in the Arabian peninsula, in the Persian Gulf, and Teheran.





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CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET BLOC MILITARY AID TO THE SOMALI REPUBLIC
(Previous reference: JIC 613/66)

I attach the agreed sanitised version of JIC(66) 36(Final) which has been passed to the Commonwealth Relations Office for release to the Kenyan Government through the British High Commission in Nairobi. No attribution to the JIC will of course be made: the document will be passed to the Kenyans as a Commonwealth Office paper.

(Signed) J.P. FOSTER

for Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
1st August, 1966

DISTRIBUTION

JIC
JIS ('B' Team)
Mr. M.H.G. Rogers, Commonwealth Office (3 extra)

SECRET

THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET MILITARY AID TO THE SOMALI REPUBLIC

This paper attempts to consider the implications of Soviet military aid to the Somali Republic and to examine briefly the extent of Soviet influence in the Somali Republic.

Soviet Military Aid Agreements

2. Soviet military aid began in effect in June 1962 when part of an economic credit granted in 1961 was allotted to the construction of army barracks and depots and probably also to the training of air force personnel in the Soviet Union. However the first military aid agreement with the Soviet Union was concluded in October 1963. It provided for aid to a gross value of over £12 million, of which £10 million worth was to be free of charge. (There is no significant military aid from any other country in the Soviet Bloc.)

3. Details of the agreement have not been obtained, but from the progress of its implementation it appears to have been designed -

(a) to re-equip the Somali Army with Soviet material;

(b) to form the nucleus of an Air Force;

(c) to form the nucleus of a Navy;

(d) to train Somalis in the Soviet Union in the handling and operation of the material to be supplied;

(e) to provide military advisers and technical assistance for the Somali Armed Forces;

(f) to increase Soviet influence through the presence of advisers on the military programme.

4. There is evidence that the Somalis approached the Soviet Union for further aid towards the end of 1965. However it appears that the Russians are not prepared to supply any additional equipment for the time being, presumably because all the material delivered under the 1963 agreement has not yet been absorbed, but they have agreed to increase technical and training assistance.

Soviet Military Aid So Far Provided

5. Because of the necessity of training Somali personnel more or less from scratch in the handling of the equipment covered by the 1963 agreement, deliveries were on a small scale until the end of 1964. The first major shipment arrived in November 1964 and deliveries have continued on a large scale since then. An estimate of the deliveries to date is at Appendix A.

Training assistance

6. The first batch of Somalis to go to the Soviet Union comprised 20 pilots and 28 other air force personnel, who began their training in August 1962. It is estimated that tho following have been sent so far -

Army	600
Air Force	250
Navy	50
Total:	900

7. The majority of 1963-1964 trainees attended short familiarisation courses and well over 200 of them had returned to Somalia by the end of 1964 when major deliveries of equipment began; many more returned in 1965. Of those sent to the Soviet Union in 1965 many were to attend courses of 18 months to 3 years duration. Other Somali personnel, from all three services, have been receiving training on Soviet equipment in UAR establishments.

Technical assistance

8. Soviet military experts began to arrive in the Somali Republic at the end of 1963. By the end of 1964 their number had increased to about 100 and it is estimated that the strength of the Soviet Military Mission is now about 200. There are over 100 army, about 50 air force, and some naval members.

The Somali Armed Forces

Strength

9. The present strength of the Somali National Army (SNA) is estimated to be 9,000. There is no organised reserve army. The army's strength is expected to increase to 10,000 by 1967 in conjunction with a planned re-organisation. A recent report suggests that a total strength of 22,000 by 1970 may be contemplated. The re-organisation, which has

already started and is due to be complete by late 1967, is unlikely to be achieved until late 1968 at the earliest. There are at present eight battalions deployed under three sector headquarters which are aligned to the political and administrative sub-divisions of the republic. Each sector also contains armoured, artillery and support elements. After re-organisation, the battalions will be integrated into mechanised battle groups containing a mechanised battalion, an artillery (self-propelled) battalion, a tank company and a service company plus support elements. Both the navy and air force are embryonic, having little equipment and few men. Although there is no organised reserve there are two sources from which the army could be strengthened. During the border conflicts with Ethiopia several thousand armed tribesmen volunteered their services and were deployed under military command. In addition the mobile force of the police (Darwishta) are para-military in organisation. They operate under their own command with eight companies (Untubcas), each of approximately 100 men, and could be deployed under military command as an effective force. The tribal police (Illaloes) who number some 3,000 are also para-military in organisation and constitute a further reserve. An outline order of battle is at Appendix B.

Morale

10. As a result of Soviet influence the armed forces are kept away from the public eye, and it is therefore difficult to assess their morale. A recent Soviet military mission is reported as having noted an atmosphere of apathy among both officers and men which manifests itself in resistance to prolonged training programmes together with continual cases of collective indiscipline. Despite this, however, on parades the troops seem exceptionally healthy and well turned out. Morale therefore is assessed as only fair to good and would almost certainly be adversely affected by the deployment of troops for long periods along the border.

Capability

11. The re-organisation is being pushed ahead under Soviet direction. Several hundred troops have been given training in the Soviet Union, this training being both of a tactical and technical nature. However the build-up is placing a heavy burden on the poverty-stricken country, which could only carry on even a limited war, after the initial operations, by importing all the necessary equipment and supplies. But the current economic position of the country renders it impossible to provide reserves to meet requirements beyond the first few days, and in view of current Soviet reluctance to recognise the struggle for unity of the Somali tribes, it is unlikely that Soviet aid would be forthcoming to back a limited war. In addition the re-organisation in progress tends to render units temporarily less effective and so far there have been no exercises held above unit level.

12. The Soviet Mission became aware of administrative shortcomings in the army evidenced by the lack of maintenance and the quantity of damage done to equipment so far supplied. There is an almost complete absence of workshops, stores and depots, and methods of storing ammunition and equipment are primitive. It is possible that the Soviet Union may attempt to remedy this situation by demanding a greater degree of control over the administration of the army and establishing depots manned by Soviet personnel.

13. This combination of lack of finance and administrative shortcomings, and the state of flux during re-organisation, renders the army ineffective other than for intervention in tribal fighting, and for defending the country for a short time in the event of external aggression. If the re-organisation is successful from a purely military and technical standpoint the potential of the force would still be limited by the lack of reserves of equipment which would be a decisive factor in the conduct of prolonged operations.

Equipment

14. With the exception of a small amount of equipment remaining from the days of British and Italian administration and a small quantity of arms from the United Arab Republic, all equipment is of Soviet origin. Under the Soviet military aid programme a variety of arms including T-34 tanks, troop carriers, field and air defence guns, fire control radar, and small arms have been received. MiG-15 and MiG-17 jet fighters and AN-2 transport aircraft have been delivered, together with some surveillance and ground control radar.

15. The military aid provided and promised by the Soviet Union includes some naval items, but there is no evidence of any intention to give the small Somali Navy more than a coastal defence role. Two Poluchat coastal patrol craft were supplied in 1965 and it is likely that a total of ten may be received in due course. Some naval training is being given in the UAR as well as in the Soviet Union.

Internal Security

16. During the period under review a large proportion of the armed forces is likely to continue to be involved in internal security operations. The Somali Republic has its own Shifta problem, and is particularly sensitive about its long borders with Ethiopia and Kenya, as a result of which much of the army is permanently stationed in the border regions.

Offensive Operations

17. It is doubtful if the Somali Republic will have the ability to carry out full scale offensive operations for some years to come. When the Russians have completed the re-equipment and re-training of the Somali Army, it could have some potential for operations of this nature. However this stage is unlikely to be reached before late 1968.

Defensive Operations

18. The army will be able to cope with any foreseeable threat from neighbouring countries. The defender will be in a position where he can take advantage of the effect of the terrain on his opponent, at the same time being nearer to his own base and thereby better placed to overcome basic administrative, logistic and organisational shortcomings.

Border Incidents

19. It is probable that border incidents will recur from time to time, particularly between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic. It is unlikely that these will involve more than individual units on either side. Even if any particular incident developed into major operations, the most likely military result would be that they would soon degenerate into stalemate, due to the inability of either side to carry out prolonged operations.

The Extent and Importance of Soviet Influence

20. Apart from military aid Soviet Bloc influence in the Somali Republic has been exercised mainly by economic means, though the Soviet Union has an important foothold in the information and broadcasting media. The Soviet gift of a 50-kilowatt transmitter to Mogadishu radio, operational since 1965, has given them an entree in this field; and communist influence of one kind or another has been noticeable for some time in the language of Mogadishu radio propaganda against Ethiopia, Kenya and Britain.

21. Communist economic aid to the Somali Republic has consisted of development credits, vocational training schemes and a few gift projects mainly from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia; (China has promised £5.6 million worth of development aid and made a gift of £1 million, half in cash and half in goods). Maritime projects, for which the Soviet Union is providing assistance, are the extension of the Port of Berbera, and the establishment of a fish canning factory at Las Khoreh, East of Berbera. These appear to be purely commercial in character although the small Soviet Naval Mission is based at Berbera.

22. There have been a few reports indicating Soviet interest in the North East coastline of the Somali Republic for strategic bases (including a submarine base) but there is no firm evidence to support them, and they are unlikely to be true. The Somali coast is desolate, devoid of natural harbours, and suffers from severe conditions of wind and swell.

23. The Soviet development projects have not been going well; only about half of the £16 million credit of 1961 has so far been used and there are difficulties both about local costs and about the suitability of some of the chosen projects. Soviet aid, civil and military, has been running at a total annual rate of some £7 million, and despite its generous terms, especially on the military side, the Somalis expect to find some difficulty in meeting their repayment obligations. Bloc aid, mainly by virtue of the arms and military and vocational training it includes, may have helped to spread Soviet influence in the army and elsewhere among the population.

24. In political terms Soviet influence in the Somali Republic, while still considerable, is less than it was in 1963/64. In their initial haste to fill the vacuum left by the rupture of Anglo/Somali relations in March 1963, and in doing so to preempt the Chinese, the Russians seem to have miscalculated in two respects: first as regards the present unpopularity of the Somali Republic in Africa, where sympathies run strongly with Ethiopia and Kenya because the "Greater Somalia" campaign (see paragraph 26 below) infringes OAU doctrine on the sanctity of national frontiers; secondly as regards the difficulties of giving large-scale aid to such a parlous economy. Their difficulties have not been made easier by the emergence in Mogadishu since late 1964 of a more moderate government, genuinely non-aligned internationally and concerned to balance Eastern with Western sources of aid. Further, there are signs that the Russians have found the Somalis difficult to deal with; and the Russians, like the Chinese, do not seem to be popular with the Somali man in the street.

25. It is possible that the Russians are finding their position in the Somali Republic of little profit and that they would welcome a face-saving opportunity to disengage to some extent. Malik's recent tour of East Africa suggests inter alia that the Russians are concerned at the reactions elsewhere, notably in Ethiopia, to the build-up of Soviet arms in the Somali Republic. Under present conditions they would probably be alarmed, as they were during the Ethiopian/Somali border fighting of 1964, if their arms seemed likely to be used for all-out war between the Somali Republic and her neighbours, especially American-armed Ethiopia.

Future Outlook

26. "Greater Somalia" - i.e. the Somali Republic's pursuit of its territorial claims in Ethiopia (where there are 500,000 Somalis), Kenya (100,000 Somalis) and French Somaliland (30,000 Somalis) - is likely to remain the cardinal objective of Somali foreign policy for the foreseeable future. For the time being it will be pursued by intensive diplomacy and propaganda, and subversion on a limited scale.

27. The Somalis probably pin their hopes on what may happen when the Emperor of Ethiopia, now in his seventies, finally dies or is removed. That event could lead to a weakening of central authority in Ethiopia and perhaps to an upheaval in parts of the Empire. The Somalis may be expected to exploit the situation to the full in an attempt to annex the Ogaden (the part of South-East Ethiopia inhabited by Somalis). They might well resort to force of arms, perhaps hoping for limited support from the Sudan and certain other Arab states. Soviet reactions would depend on the circumstances of the time: they might counsel moderation, or they might in certain eventualities follow more opportunist tactics as in the Congo in 1964. The Chinese could anyway be relied on to fan the flames. If the more powerful Ethiopian army were held down by internal trouble the Somali Army might have some initial success

28. Whatever the military situation, general African opposition to the Somali Republic would be quickly mobilised at the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations, and she would speedily come under heavy diplomatic pressure to withdraw. To have even the slightest chance of success Somali intervention would need to be accompanied by a quick, successful, and self-contained rebellion within the Ogaden. A general rising among the less numerous Somali population in the North Eastern Province of Kenya - as distinct from the current small-scale trouble there from armed "shifta" bandits - is unlikely to occur spontaneously, but would be a likely accompaniment to a rising in the Ogaden. But the chances of simultaneous and successful rebellions in both territories, even if aided by direct military intervention from the Somali Republic, must in any circumstances be remote.

29. Thus while there is no immediate likelihood of a conflict, this remains a possibility in the longer term, especially if a more extreme Somali Government were to return to power. The chances of such conflict would of course be greatly reduced either by the abandonment of Somali territorial claims, or by a settlement of the dispute, perhaps within the framework of an East African Federation such as that envisaged by the Pan African Movement for East, Central and South Africa in 1962. But neither eventuality belongs to the foreseeable future.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

30. (a) deliveries under the first Soviet military aid agreement with the Somali Republic, made in 1963, are probably almost complete. The Somalis have probably asked for a new agreement but so far the only agreement signed appears to cover technical and training assistance only (paragraph 1-4);

(b) arms deliveries under the original agreement have included tanks, field guns and fighter/ground attack aircraft, and about 900 Somalis have been sent to the Soviet Union for training. The Soviet Military Mission in the Somali Republic is probably about 200 strong (paragraphs 5-8 and Appendix A);

(c) the Somali National Army (SNA), 9,000 strong, may increase to 10,000 by 1967, with possibly some further expansion later. By 1967 or 1968 it will be organised as eight mechanised battle groups, each based on a mechanised battalion, and including tanks, artillery and support elements. Although there are no reserves the Army could be reinforced by armed tribesmer (paragraph 9);

(d) morale appears fair to good, though there is some evidence of apathy and indiscipline, but even after reorganisation it seems unlikely that the Somali Army will be capable of more than intervention in tribal fighting and defence for a short time against external aggression, mainly owing to the lack of reserves of equipment (paragraphs 10-15);

(e) although the Somali Republic has received a supply of Soviet arms the armed forces are in general capable of no more than dealing with internal security, and conducting defensive operations against the foreseeable threat from neighbouring countries. The Somalis would not be able to conduct prolonged offensive operations (paragraphs 16-18);

(f) Soviet development projects have not gone well, but military aid may have helped to spread Soviet influence among the army and elsewhere (paragraph 23);

(g) in political terms Soviet influence while still considerable is less than it was in 1963/64. It is possible that the Russians overlooked the present unpopularity of the Somali Republic in Africa, and they may even wish to disengage to some extent (paragraphs 24-25);

(h) there have been a few reports indicating Soviet interest in the north-east coastline of the Somali Republic for strategic bases (including a submarine base), but there is no firm evidence to support them and they are considered unlikely to be true (paragraph 22);

(i) although there is no immediate likelihood of conflict, the Somali claim to "Greater Somalia" could result in an attempt to annex the Ogaden, if the death or removal of the Emperor resulted in an upheaval in Ethiopia. Somali chances of success would be slight (paragraphs 26-29).

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Estimated delivery of Soviet Military Equipment to the Somali Republic up to April 1966

Army

T54 tanks	20+
T34 tanks	80+
BTR-152 (armoured personnel carrier)	150+
BTR-40 / Armoured cars	60+
Su-85 SP guns	10+
85-mm field guns	50
76-mm field guns	100+
57-mm AT guns	50
57-mm AD guns	48
37-mm guns	130
100-mm field gun (Czech)	8
120-mm mortars / 82-mm mortars	200

Multi-barrelled rocket launcher

BM-14	140 mm	probably 7
BM-24	240 mm	probably 3

Small arms including 12.7-mm 14.5-mm ADMG and B10 and B11 guns	10,000+
Soft-skinned vehicles	2,000

Air Force

MIG-17	8
MIG-15 and U MIG-15	8
AN-2	3

Navy

Poluchat patrol craft	2

Large quanties of ammunition, spare parts, communications equipment, radars, workshop vehicles and other ancillary equipment have also been delivered

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Appendix 'B'

SOMALI DEFENCE ORGANISATION & ORDER OF BATTLE

Prime Minister(C-in-C)

Minister of Defence

HQ S.N.A.

Commanding General

Navy

2 Inshore Patrol Craft(USSR)
(Personnel Strength 180)

Army

Horsed Bn.

Air Force

2 x U MiG.15(Midget)
6 x MiG.15(Faggot)
8 x MiG.17 (not yet operational)

HQ Northern Sector

Birgeh Bn
Dayah Bn
Olol Bn

HQ Central Sector

Gaibdid Bn
Gamadid Bn

HQ Southern Sector

Libside Bn
Gulwade Bn

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Appendix 'C'

SOMALI REPUBLIC

MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

1. Navy	
Training Ships	-
Patrol Craft	2 (+ 8 to come)
Landing Craft	-
2. Air Force	
GA	-
DF/GA	14 MiG.15 & 17)
Transport	-
Training & Light Ac	5(2U.MiG.15 - 3 AN2)
3. Army	
a. Armour	115
b. Armoured Car/APC	238
c. Artillery	
Field	150(incl 10 Sp.)
Anti Tank	100
Air Defence	160
d. Mortars	200 +
e. Multibarrel R/L	10(?)
f. Recoilless rifle	30
g. Radar	9(AA control surveillance & early warning)
h. Vehicles	2000+
j. Small arms	10,000

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2nd Reference: JIC(66) 36 (Final)
dated 30th June, 1966

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

SOVIET AID TO THE SOMALI REPUBLIC

The Chiefs of Staff (COS 38th Meeting/66, Part I, Item 10, dated 27th July, 1966) have taken note of the above-quoted report by the Joint Intelligence Committee.

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

28th July, 1966.

EXTRACT from C.O.S.(66) 38th MEETING held on 27.7.66.

Annex I to COS 38th Meeting/66
27th July 1966

104. SOVIET AID TO EAST AFRICA - PUBLIC [illegible] RESTRICTED

The Secretary was informed by telephone that the Chiefs of Staff had taken note of a report (1) prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee.

Note

1. [illegible] (JIC(66) 98(Final)).

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET BLOC MILITARY AID TO THE SOMALI REPUBLIC

(Previous reference: JIC(66)27th Meeting, Item 12)

I attach a sanitised version of JIC(66)36 (Final) which has been prepared by the Commonwealth Relations Office for release to the Kenyan Government. No attribution to the JIC will of ccurse be made.

2. It is proposed that the British High Commission in Nairobi should pass the document to the Kenyan Government as a paper prepared in the Commonwealth Relations Office and unless I hear to the contrary (Ext.139) by 5.00 p.m. on FRIDAY, 29th JULY 1966 your concurrence in the draft will be assumed and action taken accordingly.

(Signed) J.P. FOSTER

for Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

19th July, 1966

DISTRIBUTION

JIC
JIS('B' Team)
Mr. M.H.G. Rogers, CRO (2 extra)

SECRET

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3. Details of the agreement have not been obtained, but from the progress of its implementation it appears to have been designed -

(a) to re-equip the Somali Army with Soviet material

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(e) to provide military advisers and technical assistance for the Somali Armed Forces;

(f) to increase Soviet influence through the presence of advisers on the military programme.

4. There is evidence that the Somalis approached the Soviet Union for further aid towards the end of 1965. It does not appear that any agreement was reached for the provision of additional equipment; but an agreement was probably signed in February 1966 to cover the provision of further technical aid over the next ten years. This was provisional on the non-acceptance of training and military advice from any other country. It included the training of 150 to 200 Somali military personnel a year in the Soviet Union, details to be agreed each year in advance.

Soviet Military Aid So Far Provided

5. Because of the necessity of training Somali personnel more or less from scratch in the handling of the equipment covered by the 1963 agreement, deliveries were on a small scale until the end of 1964. The first major shipment arrived in November 1964 and deliveries have continued on a large scale since then. An estimate of the deliveries to date is at Appendix A.

Training assistance

6. The first batch of Somalis to go to the Soviet Union comprised 20 pilots and 28 other air force personnel, who began their training in August 1962. Up to now the following are known to have been sent:

	1962	1963	1964	1965	Total
Army	-	300	145	130+	575+
Air Force	48	100	45	60+	250+
Navy	-	-	40	25	65
				Total:	890+

7. The majority of 1963-1964 trainees attended short familiarisation courses and well over 200 of them had returned to Somalia by the end of 1964 when major deliveries of equipment began; many more returned in 1965. Of those sent to the Soviet Union in 1965 many were to attend courses of 18 months to 3 years duration. Other Somali personnel, from all three services, have been receiving training on Soviet equipment in UAR establishments.

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8. Soviet military experts began to arrive in the Somali Republic at the end of 1963. By the end of 1964 their number had increased to about 100 and it is estimated that the strength of the Soviet Military Mission is now about 200. There are over 100 army, about 50 air force, and some naval members.

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Strength

9. The present strength of the Somali National Army (SNA) is estimated to be 9,000. There is no organised reserve army. The army's strength is expected to increase to 10,000 by 1967 in conjunction with a planned re-organisation. A recent report suggests that a total strength of 22,000 by 1970 may be contemplated. The re-organisation, which has

already started and is due to be complete by late 1967, is unlikely to be achieved until late 1968 at the earliest. There are at present eight battalions deployed under three sector headquarters which are aligned to the political and administrative sub-divisions of the republic. Each sector also contains armoured, artillery and support elements. After re-organisation, the battalions will be integrated into mechanised battle groups containing a mechanised battalion, an artillery (self-propelled) battalion, a tank company and a service company plus support elements. Both the navy and air force are embryonic, having little equipment and few men. Although there is no organised reserve there are two sources from which the army could be strengthened. During the border conflicts with Ethiopia several thousand armed tribesmen volunteered their services and were deployed under military command. In addition the mobile force of the police (Darwishta) are para-military in organisation. They operate under their own command with eight companies (Untubcas), each of approximately 100 men, and could be deployed under military command as an effective force. The tribal police (Illaloes) who number some 3,000 are also para-military in organisation and constitute a further reserve. An outline order of battle is at Appendix B.

Morale

10. As a result of Soviet influence the armed forces are kept away from the public eye, and it is therefore difficult to assess their morale. A recent Soviet military mission is reported as having noted an atmosphere of apathy among both officers and men which manifests itself in resistance to prolonged training programmes together with continual cases of collective indiscipline. Despite this, however, on parades the troops seem exceptionally healthy and well turned out. Morale therefore is assessed as only fair to good and would almost certainly be adversely affected by the deployment of troops for long periods along the border.

Capability

11. The re-organisation is being pushed ahead under Soviet direction. Several hundred troops have been given training in the Soviet Union, this training being both of a tactical and technical nature. However the build-up is placing a heavy burden on the poverty-stricken country, which could only carry on even a limited war, after the initial operations, by importing all the necessary equipment and supplies. But the current economic position of the country renders it impossible to provide reserves to meet requirements beyond the first few days, and in view of current Soviet reluctance to recognise the struggle for unity of the Somali tribes, it is unlikely that Soviet aid would be forthcoming to back a limited war. In addition the re-organisation in progress tends to render units temporarily less effective and so far there have been no exercises held above unit level.

12. The Soviet Mission became aware of administrative shortcomings in the army evidenced by the lack of maintenance and the quantity of damage done to equipment so far supplied. There is an almost complete absence of workshops, stores and depots, and methods of storing ammunition and equipment are primitive. It is possible that the Soviet Union may attempt to remedy this situation by demanding a greater degree of control over the administration of the army and establishing depots manned by Soviet personnel.

13. This combination of lack of finance and administrative shortcomings, and the state of flux during re-organisation, renders the army ineffective other than for intervention in tribal fighting, and for defending the country for a short time in the event of external aggression. It is difficult to assess its potential on completion of the re-organisation, as the Somali Republic is attempting something never before undertaken by a "black African" country - the development of a sophisticated modern mechanised army. If the re-organisation is successful from a purely military and technical standpoint the potential of the force would still be limited by the lack of reserves of equipment which would be a decisive factor in the conduct of prolonged operations.

Equipment

14. With the exception of a small amount of equipment remaining from the days of British and Italian administration and a small quantity of arms from the United Arab Republic, all equipment is of Soviet origin. Under the Soviet military aid programme a variety of arms including T-34 tanks, troop carriers, field and air defence guns, fire control radar, and small arms have been received. MiG-15 and MiG-17 jet fighters and AN-2 transport aircraft have been delivered, together with some surveillance and ground control radar.

15. The military aid provided and promised by the Soviet Union includes some naval items, but there is no evidence of any intention to give the small Somali Navy more than a coastal defence role. Two Poluchat coastal patrol craft were supplied in 1965 and it is likely that a total of ten may be received in due course. Some naval training is being given in the UAR as well as in the Soviet Union.

Internal Security

16. During the period under review a large proportion of the armed forces is likely to continue to be involved in internal security operations. The Somali Republic has its own Shifta problem, and is particularly sensitive about its long borders with Ethiopia and Kenya, as a result of which much of the army is permanently stationed in the border regions.

Offensive Operations

17. It is doubtful if the Somali Republic will have the ability to carry out full scale offensive operations for some years to come. When the Russians have completed the re-equipment and re-training of the Somali Army, it could have some potential for operations of this nature. However this stage is unlikely to be reached before late 1968.

Defensive Operations

18. The army will be able to cope with any foreseeable threat from neighbouring countries. The defender will be in a position where he can take advantage of the effect of the terrain on his opponent, at the same time being nearer to his own base and thereby better placed to overcome basic administrative, logistic and organisational shortcomings.

Border Incidents

19. It is probable that border incidents will recur from time to time, particularly between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic. It is unlikely that these will involve more than individual units on either side. Even if any particular incident developed into major operations, the most likely military result would be that they would soon degenerate into stalemate, due to the inability of either side to carry out prolonged operations.

The Extent and Importance of Soviet Influence

20. Apart from military aid Soviet Bloc influence in the Somali Republic has been exercised mainly by economic means, though the Soviet Union has an important foothold in the information and broadcasting media. The Soviet gift of a 50-kilowatt transmitter to Mogadishu radio, operational since 1965, has given them an entree in this field; and communist influence of one kind or another has been noticeable for some time in the language of Mogadishu radio propaganda against Ethiopia, Kenya and Britain.

21. Communist economic aid to the Somali Republic has consisted of development credits, vocational training schemes and a few gift projects mainly from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia; (China has promised £5.6 million worth of development aid and made a gift of £1 million, half in cash and half in goods). Maritime projects, for which the Soviet Union is providing assistance, are the extension of the Port of Berbera, and the establishment of a fish canning factory at Las Khoreh, East of Berbera. These appear to be purely commercial in character although the small Soviet Naval Mission is based at Berbera.

22. There have been a few reports indicating Soviet interest in the North East coastline of the Somali Republic for strategic bases (including a submarine base) but there is no firm evidence to support them, and they are unlikely to be true. The Somali coast is desolate, devoid of natural harbours, and suffers from severe conditions of wind and swell.

23. The Soviet development projects have not been going well; only about half of the £16 million credit of 1961 has so far been used and there are difficulties both about local costs and about the suitability of some of the chosen projects. Soviet aid, civil and military, has been running at a total annual rate of some £7 million, and despite its generous terms, especially on the military side, the Somalis expect to find some difficulty in meeting their repayment obligations. Bloc aid, mainly by virtue of the arms and military and vocational training it includes, may have helped to spread Soviet influence in the army and elsewhere among the population.

24. In political terms Soviet influence in the Somali Republic, while still considerable, is less than it was in 1963/64. In their initial haste to fill the vacuum left by the rupture of Anglo/Somali relations in March 1963, and in doing so to preempt the Chinese, the Russians seem to have miscalculated in two respects: first as regards the present unpopularity of the Somali Republic in Africa, where sympathies run strongly with Ethiopia and Kenya because the "Greater Somalia" campaign (see paragraph 26 below) infringes OAU doctrine on the sanctity of national frontiers; secondly as regards the difficulties of giving large-scale aid to such a parlous economy. Their difficulties have not been made easier by the emergence in Mogadishu since late 1964 of a more moderate government, genuinely non-aligned internationally and concerned to balance Eastern with Western sources of aid. Further, there are signs that the Russians have found the Somalis difficult to deal with; and the Russians, like the Chinese, do not seem to be popular with the Somali man in the street.

25. It is possible that the Russians are finding their position in the Somali Republic of little profit and that they would welcome a face-saving opportunity to disengage to some extent. Malik's recent tour of East Africa suggests inter alia that the Russians are concerned at the reactions elsewhere, notably in Ethiopia, to the build-up of Soviet arms in the Somali Republic. Under present conditions they would probably be alarmed, as they were during the Ethiopian/Somali border fighting of 1964, if their arms seemed likely to be used for all-out war between the Somali Republic and her neighbours, especially American-armed Ethiopia.

Future Outlook

26. "Greater Somalia" - i.e. the Somali Republic's pursuit of its territorial claims in Ethiopia (where there are 500,000 Somalis), Kenya (100,000 Somalis) and French Somaliland (30,000 Somalis) - is likely to remain the cardinal objective of Somali foreign policy for the foreseeable future. For the time being it will be pursued by intensive diplomacy and propagar propaganda, and subversion on a limited scale.

27. The Somalis probably pin their hopes on what may happen when the Emperor of Ethiopia, now in his seventies, finally dies or is removed. That event could lead to a weakening of central authority in Ethiopia and perhaps to an upheaval in parts of the Empire. The Somalis may be expected to exploit the situation to the full in an attempt to annex the Ogaden (the part of South-East Ethiopia inhabited by Somalis). They might well resort to force of arms, perhaps hoping for limited support from the Sudan and certain other Arab states. Soviet reactions would depend on the circumstances of the time: they might counsel modernisation, or they might in certain eventualities follow more opportunist tactics as in the Congo in 1964. The Chinese could anyway be relied on to fan the flames. If the more powerful Ethiopian army were held down by internal trouble the Somali Army might have some initial success

28. Whatever the military situation, general African opposition to the Somali Republic would be quickly mobilised at the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations, and she would speedily come under heavy diplomatic pressure to withdraw. To have even the slightest chance of success Somali intervention would need to be accompanied by a quick, successful, and self-contained rebellion within the Ogaden. A general rising among the less numerous Somali population in the North Eastern Province of Kenya - as distinct from the current small-scale trouble there from armed "shifta" bandits - is unlikely to occur spontaneously, but would be a likely accompaniment to a rising in the Ogaden. But the chances of simultaneous and successful rebellions in both territories, even if aided by direct military intervention from the Somali Republic, must in any circumstances be remote.

29. Thus while there is no immediate likelihood of a conflict, this remains a possibility in the longer term, especially if a more extreme Somali Government were to return to power. The chances of such conflict would of course be greatly reduced either by the abandonment of Somali territorial claims, or by a settlement of the dispute, perhaps within the framework of an East African Federation such as that envisaged by the Pan African Movement for East, Central and South Africa in 1962. But neither eventuality belongs to the foreseeable future.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

30. (a) deliveries under the first Soviet military aid agreement with the Somali Republic, made in 1963, are probably almost complete. The Somalis have probably asked for a new agreement but so far the only agreement signed appears to cover technical and training assistance only (paragraph 1-4);

(b) arms deliveries under the original agreement have included tanks, field guns and fighter/ground attack aircraft, and nearly 900 Somalis are known to have been sent to the Soviet Union for training. The Soviet Military Mission in the Somali Republic is probably about 200 strong (paragraphs 5-8 and Appendix A);

(c) the Somali National Army (SNA), 9,000 strong, may increase to 10,000 by 1967, with possibly some further expansion later. By 1967 or 1968 it will be organised as eight mechanised battle groups, each based on a mechanised battalion, and including tanks, artillery and support elements. Although there are no reserves the Army could be reinforced by armed tribesmen (paragraph 9);

(d) morale appears fair to good, though there is some evidence of apathy and indiscipline, but even after reorganisation it seems unlikely that the Somali Army will be capable of more than intervention in tribal fighting and defence for a short time against external aggression, mainly owing to the lack of reserves of equipment (paragraphs 10-15);

(e) although the Somali Republic has received a supply of Soviet arms the armed forces are in general capable of no more than dealing with internal security, and conducting defensive operations against the foreseeable threat from neighbouring countries. Somali would not be able to conduct prolonged offensive operations (paragraphs 16-18);

(f) Soviet development projects have not gone well, but military aid may have helped to spread Soviet influence among the army and elsewhere (paragraph 23);

(g) in political terms Soviet influence while still considerable is less than it was in 1963/64. It is possible that the Russians overlooked the present unpopularity of the Somali Republic in Africa, and they may even wish to disengage to some extent (paragraphs 24-25);

(h) there have been a few reports indicating Soviet interest in the north-east coastline of the Somali Republic for strategic bases (including a submarine base), but there is no firm evidence to support them and they are considered unlikely to be true (paragraph 22);

(i) although there is no immediate likelihood of conflict, the Somali claim to "Greater Somalia" could result in an attempt to annex the Ogaden, if the death or removal of the Emperor resulted in an upheaval in Ethiopia. Somali chances of success would be slight (paragraphs 26-29).

Estimated delivery of Soviet Military Equipment to the Somali Republic up to April 1966

Army			
T54 tanks			20+
T34 tanks			80+
BTR-152 (armoured personnel carrier)			150+
BTR-40 / Armoured cars			60+
Su-85 SP guns			10+
85-mm field guns			50
76-mm field guns			100+
57-mm AT guns			50
57-mm AD guns			48
37-mm guns			130
100-mm field gun (Czech)			8
120-mm mortars / 82-mm mortars			200
Multi-barrelled rocket launcher			
	BM-14	140 mm	probably 7
	BM-24	240 mm	probably 3
Small arms including 12.7-mm 14.5-mm ADMG and B10 and B11 guns			10,000+
Soft-skinned vehicles			2,000
Air Force			
MIG-17			8
MIG-15 and U MIG-15			8
AN-2			3
Navy			
Poluchat patrol craft			2

Large quanties of ammunition, spare parts, communications equipment, radars, workshop vehicles and other ancillary equipment have also been delivered

Appendix 'B' to JIC 613/66

SOMALI DEFENCE ORGANISATION & ORDER OF BATTLE

Prime Minister(C-in-C)

Minister of Defence

HQ S.N.A.

Commanding General

Navy

2 Inshore Patrol Craft(USSR)
(Personnel Strength 180)

Army

Horsed Bn.

Air Force

2 x U MiG.15(Midget)
6 x MiG.15(Faggot)
8 x MiG.17 (not yet operational)

HQ Northern Sector

Birgeh Bn
Dayah Bn
Olol Bn

HQ Central Sector

Gaibdid Bn
Gamadid Bn

HQ Southern Sector

Libside Bn
Gulwade Bn

Appendix 'C' to JIC 613/66

SOMALI REPUBLIC

MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

1. Navy	
Training Ships	-
Patrol Craft	2 (+ 8 to come)
Landing Craft	-
2. Air Force	
GA	-
DF/GA	14 MiG.15 & 17)
Transport	-
Training & Light Ac	5(2U.MiG.15 - 3 AN2)
3. Army	
a. Armour	115
b. Armoured Car/APC	238
c. Artillery	
Field	150(incl 10 Sp.)
Anti Tank	100
Air Defence	160
d. Mortars	200 +
e. Multibarrel R/L	10(?)
f. Recoilless rifle	30
g. Radar	9(AA control surveillance & early warning)
h. Vehicles	2000+
j. Small arms	10,000

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE
DOWNING STREET
LONDON S.W.1

SECRET

15 July, 1957

Whitehall 2323/*Ext.*
Your reference:
Please quote in reply: C-[illegible] 43/37/1

Dear Alan,

217/2

The Installations of Soviet Bloc Missions in the Somali Republic

Will you please refer to Conclusion 2 of the 11th or 12th(SC)45th Meeting held on 30 June?

2. I enclose copy No. 101 of JIC(SC)50(Final) which we have decided to send it suitable to be passed to the Somali Government. If you agree with this version, we would be grateful if you would circulate it for telephone clearance.

3. We propose that our High Commissioner's office in Mogadishu should pass the document to the Somali Government on a copy supplied in the Commonwealth Relations Office. No distribution by the J.I.C. will of course be made.

Yours sincerely,
Martin

(M. F. A. Regan)

Lt.-Col. Quinn, M.C.,
Cabinet Office,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLIO 8

217/2

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

Reference: JIC(66)36(Final)

COPY NO. 41

Dated 13th July, 1966

CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET BLOC MILITARY AID TO THE SOMALI REPUBLIC

Departments may wish to note that the above report has been passed to the following:-

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Secretary of State for Defence
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

13th July, 1966

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E.R.

J 217/2

FOLIO 7

MR. W.K. REID

[Free copy to Records]

I attach Sir Burke Trend's copy of JIC(66) 36 (Final), "The Implications of Soviet Bloc Military Aid to the Somali Republic".

2. The report meets a Foreign Office request for a study on the implications of Soviet aid for the military balance between the Somali Republic and her neighbours, Ethiopia and Kenya; and also examines the overall extent of Soviet Bloc influence in the country and the likelihood of conflict in the area.

3. The report concludes that the supply of Soviet equipment to the Somali Republic has probably offset the numerical superiority of the Ethiopian forces and given the republic the advantage over Kenya; however, none of these countries would be able to conduct prolonged offensive operations. Conflict between them is unlikely: only if there were a political upheaval in Ethiopia would there be any likelihood of the Somali Republic attempting to annex the Ogaden which is inhabited by Somalis.

4. Soviet military aid may have helped to spread Soviet influence among the army and elsewhere, but in political terms Soviet influence in the Somali Republic, while still considerable, is less than it was two or three years ago.

5. I recommend that I be authorised to pass this report to the Foreign, Defence and Commonwealth Secretaries.

F B Richards.

(F.B. RICHARDS)

11th July, 1966

1 am.

JIC Clerks.

Please so distribute.

FBR 12/7.

Sent. 13/7/66

SECRET

EXTRACT from J I C (66) 11th MEETING held on 17 Mar 66

(1)

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13. SOMALIA 217/2.

MR. CRICK said that the Foreign Office had expressed a requirement for a paper on Somalia, taking account particularly of Soviet military aid and its effects on the military balance between Somalia and her neighbours. The JIC had previously pappared a regional study on the outlook for the Horn of Africa (JIC(60) 19), but in spite of the recent trend towards regional reports the current Foreign Office requirement was confined to the subject as defined above.

The Committee -

(1) Agreed that a report should be prepared on Soviet military aid to Somalia and its effects on the military balance between Somalia and Ethiopia/Kenya.

(2) Instructed the Chairman, JIS, to circulate draft terms of reference for clearance our of Committee.

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